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ABSTRACT 
 
Chinese accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001 forever altered the international 
economy as it marked the political-economic diversification of international trade negotiations 
and law. Before the implications of Chinese accession became apparent, scholars predicted that 
Chinese WTO membership would greatly affect the Organization. While this thesis agrees with 
this general sentiment, it insists that China’s effect on the WTO is not wholly negative or 
positive and requires a nuanced, sub-institutional assessment to understand. Qualifying and 
expanding upon scholars’ pre-2001 predictions, this thesis argues that for the most part, China 
did not proactively cause instances of institutional weakness and organizational ineffectuality. 
Rather, China’s behavior within the WTO illuminates the Organization’s inherent inability to 
handle political-economic diversity. Further, this thesis argues that the original dispute 
settlement rules and procedures created to handle China no longer apply uniformly to the 
Chinese economic situation. China exists in a liminal space between socialism and capitalism, 
and the WTO is still unable to fully and adequately handle this political-economic ambiguity.   
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SECTION I: INTRODUCTION  
In the wake of the Second World War, the forty-four Allies met to construct new 
international economic, financial, and monetary institutions to facilitate globalization and 
maintain peaceful economic interdependence between nations.1 At this conference in Bretton 
Woods, New Hampshire, the delegates founded the World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The World Bank would 
serve as a creditor to developing countries seeking to spend on infrastructure and poverty 
alleviation programs.2 The IMF would both lend to member countries and monitor global 
exchange rates (which were fixed to the U.S. dollar which was valued absolutely in terms of 
gold).3 Last, the GATT, now espoused by the World Trade Organization (WTO), was originally 
founded to facilitate “rounds” of multilateral trade negotiations, to orchestrate multilateral tariff 
reduction initiatives, and to ensure non-discriminatory trade between nations.4  
Scholars of international relations tend to agree that the Bretton Woods system was 
pushed and shaped most by the United States, the hegemonic superpower at the time, to establish 
a postwar era of international relations that would serve its own interests first and foremost.5 
Though the United States led the charge, other major Allied powers such as Canada, the United 
Kingdom, and France joined the U.S. as the key players in the GATT’s construction.6 The 
rationale behind the GATT relied on neoliberal theories that economic interdependence deters 
countries from fighting each other.7 The Allies fashioned the GATT to lower tariffs (and thus 
increase trade flows and interdependence) in order to mitigate the possibility of another world 
war. Other than the major powers themselves, most of the twenty-three original GATT 
signatories were former colonies, imminently independent nations, or current but largely 
autonomous colonies of the signing Powers.8 As the neoliberal theory maintains, international 
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trade is the fundamental component of economic interdependence.1 It would seem, then, that the 
non-power signatories to the GATT joined the agreement for the following potential reasons 1) 
as the result of bilateral negotiations with their colonizers over economic resources in flux or 2) 
as proactive attempt to maintain economic ties with their powerful colonizers while becoming de 
jure independent.  
China stands out as a unique GATT signatory within the framework discussed above, as 
China withdrew from negotiations in 1949 upon the establishment of the communist People’s 
Republic of China (PRC).9 To be sure, Cuba also joined the original GATT and has remained an 
adherent to the treaty despite its own non-capitalist nature.10 However, the conditions in which 
Cuba joined seem less idiosyncratic than China’s, as Cuba is a former colony of the United 
States and maintained extremely close economic and political relations with the United States 
until the Cuban Revolution in 1959.11 Further, despite Cuba’s planned economy, the major WTO 
members do not allot Cuba the second-class status for this as they give China, probably because 
Cuban planning has little macroeconomic consequence for the powerful WTO members.12 This 
dynamic hints at the fundamentally political nature of non-market economy (NME) designations. 
Still, the prominence, international trade practices, and socialism of China, however, tell a 
completely different story.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The original GATT signatories were as follows: “The Governments of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, the Kingdom of Belgium, the United States of Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, the 
Republic of Chile, the Republic of China, the Republic of Cuba, Czechoslovak Republic, the 
French Republic, India, Lebanon, the Grand-Duchy of Luxemburg, the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Kingdom of Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, the Union 
of South Africa, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United 
States of America.” Of these, Burma and Ceylon (Sri Lanka) gained independence from the U.K. 
in 1948 and India and Pakistan became independent in 1947. Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) 
and South Africa remained under the official auspices of the United Kingdom until 1980 and 
1961 respectively. Lebanon and Syria gained independence from France in 1943 and 1946 
respectively (independence information from the CIA Factbook).   	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History shows a clear relationship between protectionist trade policies and socialism. 
Karl Kautsky noted that free trade, historically, served as the defining characteristic of full-
blown capitalism.13 He emphasized the importance of protecting poor individuals and entire poor 
countries from becoming suspended in proletarianism through the proliferation of international 
trade.14 Just as the division of labor led to greater economic wellbeing of internal industrial 
sectors vis-a-vis agricultural sectors, the international “division of labor,” a.k.a, comparative 
advantage in trade would allow capital intensive, industrialized economies to prevail over 
agrarian-based economies. In the historical view of those trading with a planning economy, there 
were (an still are) equally compelling reasons to be skeptical of liberalized trade. In the year that 
China rescinded initial GATT membership, Bert Hoselitz asserted that “theory and practice of 
national economic planning agree that the exchange of goods and services between a planned 
economy and the outside world must be carried out by a state trading monopoly or by bulk-
purchase agreements.”15 In a contemporary context, in which most goods and services are 
exported to some extent to other countries, nationalized monopolies would control the entire 
spread of consumer goods and services. A monopoly is not subject to competition, and thus 
market-based prices, from other firms, and can establish the domestic “normal value,” to use 
WTO language of its product without much contention.16 This would make it difficult to penalize 
a planning economy for pricing and trading practices, as they could be both discriminatory and 
simply indicative of its inorganic economic situation.   
It follows that an influential socialist economy in the GATT/WTO would both be 
paradoxical and deleterious to the institution’s goals. In this vein, aside from the establishment of 
the WTO itself, China’s re-accession in November 2001 was the most significant event in the 
history of the institutionalized international trading system.17 China joined the WTO after fifteen 
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years of arduous negotiations and its accession was unlike that of any other WTO member at that 
time.18 Two conditions to the China Accession Protocol are particularly interesting, as they run 
counter to the WTO’s purpose to facilitate cooperation between capitalist markets, or market 
economies, for further trade liberalization. First, China allowed countries to label it a “non-
market economy” (NME) until 2016 for the purposes of anti-dumping (AD) investigations and 
indefinitely for countervailing duty (CVD) cases.19 Second, China acquiesced to demands for a 
specific “China Safeguard,” or a duty on Chinese goods that countries could institute to limit 
importation until 2013.20 While the China Safeguard is now obsolete, special dumping margins 
and subsidy levels using NME methodology still aim to protect importing countries from 
Chinese attempts to gain an unfair state-driven trading advantage, or as some may argue, from 
fair Chinese export oriented policies. 
NME status offers countries significant freedom in determining dumping margins. 
Further, the China Safeguard was a country-specific tariff and therefore undermined the WTO’s 
“Most Favored Nation” (MFN) law, which asserts that a country must award the lowest tariff 
levels it gives to one country to all countries.21 These provisions clearly conflict with core 
objectives of the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT), now espoused by and 
synonymous with the WTO. While much literature exists describing the accession process’ affect 
on the politics and political economy of China internally, less has been written about the effect of 
China’s unique behavior and legal treatment (and legal treatment of the NMEs in general) on the 
WTO’s institutions, diplomatic goals, and perceived responsibilities.   
This paper attempts to bridge some of the gaps in scholarship. Specifically, this thesis 
explores the following questions:  
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1. How has the accession and participation of China, both as a “non-market economy” and 
as its own unique force, affected the institutions, functionality, diplomatic initiatives, and 
legal culture of the WTO?  
2. What can one learn about the WTO’s structural integrity and future topics of interest to 
WTO members from NME participation?  
 
 These multidimensional questions are intellectually and politically interesting for a 
number of reasons. The GATT/WTO serves as a mechanism for countries to negotiate lower 
tariffs and to eradicate technical barriers to trade. The elimination of these policies further 
connects and marketizes the international economy. Even before the establishment of the WTO, 
Russian scholars argued that the quintessential embodiment and synthesis of “the world capitalist 
economy” would be an organization devoted to trade liberalization.22 Naturally, then, non-
capitalist countries kept their distance from the GATT until the end of the Cold War. China’s re-
joining in 2001, followed by Viet Nam’s inclusion in 2007 and Russia’s in 2012, marked a major 
trend of political-economic diversification of WTO membership.23 This paper explores how the 
WTO understands and has handled this diversification, despite said diversification running 
contradictory to the WTO’s established structure.  
 
SECTION II: PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION OF THIS THESIS 
In 2002, Robert Keohane argued that, “among international organizations, the WTO 
stands out as having quite authoritative and precise rules and a relatively good record of eventual 
compliance with those rules by governments.”24 Even with the increased participation of non-
market economies, the WTO remains the most respected international organization in terms of 
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compliance with rulings in disputes and regarding members state recognition of its institutional 
importance. Through 2007, member countries had complied with “virtually all” of the rulings 
compelling them to revise behaviors or domestic statutes to ensure adherence with WTO rules 
and commitments.25 By 2015, the WTO dispute settlement system had released 460 rulings, and 
“almost all” of these rulings have still resulted in members’ WTO-consistent modification of 
practices.26 Further, countries respect the jurisprudential and interpretive methods inherent to the 
WTO system and have, in certain cases, both integrated such methods into domestic legal 
practice and into bilateral and regional investment arbitral systems.27  
One problem that this thesis examines in its section on dispute settlement is not whether 
compliance with or respect for the rules or use of institutions has decreased but whether these 
rules and legal methods themselves have become less “precise,” and “authoritative.” In other 
words, one can easily follow the rules if the rules provide for eclectic and divergent 
interpretations, as well as room to half-comply. Section II explains the technical and legal terms 
addressed in this paper in greater depth. The most important and/or controversial of these terms 
include: non-market economy (NME), market injury vs. disruption, and state owned enterprise 
vs. “public body.” In fact, this thesis argues that NME and public body definitions, as permitted 
and left un-synthesized by the WTO legal system, undermine the WTO rules based system.  
Section III introduces the theories of Chinese influence on the WTO hypothesized by two 
prominent international trade scholars — John Jackson and Deborah Z. Cass — and explores the 
extent to which these theories materialized according to existing literature. Section IV serves as a 
continued review of this existing literature and delves into the documented theories of China’s 
(and other NMEs’) participation in the WTO. Section V details the interview process, 
methodological considerations taken in original analysis of disputes and party submissions. 
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Additionally, Section V details the marketization analysis conducted in the later section on 
dispute settlement and NME methods for calculating dumping margins. Also included in Section 
V is a list of the original interview questions. Section VI presents the findings from this 
economic and legal research and synthesizes it with existent scholarship and interview 
commentary. The findings section also discusses China’s influence on less tangible aspects of the 
WTO system, such its Eurocentric foundations and perceived legitimacy, the way in which 
countries prepare to join it, and what the international community considers to be issues within 
its purview. Section VII explains the relevance of this analysis and offers new ideas about the 
implications of potential NME methodology expiration in December of 2016. Section VIII 
concludes.  
 
SECTON III: POLITICAL-ECONOMIC TERMS, TRADE JARGON AND THE 
COMPLICATIONS OF NME CLASSIFICATION  
Before delving into terms specific to this thesis project, it is important to understand the 
basic types of “trade remedies” and accompanying dispute settlement cases that arise within the 
WTO system. The two main types of “trade remedies” are anti-dumping duties (AD) and 
countervailing duties (CVD). An importing country can initiate an AD investigation against an 
exporter when it believes that a good has been “dumped” — underpriced in the importing 
country vis-à-vis the domestic markets of the exporter — thereby causing injury to domestic 
producers of the good in the importing country.28 As the WTO explains, determining the extent 
to which a product was dumped (the “dumping margin”) requires highly technical and 
convoluted data about the markets, exchange rates, and product prices in the relevant countries.29 
It becomes even more difficult to obtain market data from NMEs (like China) where the country 
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is largely marketized but certain firms, industries, or even entire regions determine prices 
through government planning.30 Conversely, accurate and comprehensive price data is equally 
difficult to find when most of a country (for example, Viet Nam) operates under “non-market 
economy” conditions but some small, individual firms price according to market trends.31   
China contains a significant number of exporting state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and can 
keep their outward prices artificially low through subsidies or equivalent mechanisms. 32 
Countervailing duties are the trade remedy tool used to mitigate the effects of government 
subsidization. If a country provides “prohibited subsidies” —financial support for exporting 
firms or for “domestic over imported goods” — WTO members can impose an additional charge 
when importing the foreign goods in question.33Further, many countries accuse China of 
devaluing its currency to make its exports more competitive in the international marketplace. 
This mechanism is not directly supervised and regulated by the WTO, but hypothetically, import 
safeguards, such as the China Safeguard, could offset the effects of a currency-related boom of 
goods coming from China. At their core, AD duties, CVDs, and import safeguards all attempt to 
fix the same problem; all aim to make it more expensive from domestic firms to import foreign 
goods from countries attempting to gain unfair trade advantages. The economic policy 
mechanisms that may be employed by planning governments (such as subsidization of SOEs, 
currency manipulation, and artificially low export pricing, the last of which could be employed 
by any country, NME or not) all have the same effects in international trade as dumping 
strategies employed by independent, market-operating firms. The difficulty in determining both 
a) whether the source of the market disruption is a government decision or not and b) the extent 
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to which each of the aforementioned policy mechanisms is responsible for a cumulative injury to 
a foreign market is amplified in cases involving planned or semi-planned economies.2  
Though this paper explores “non-market economies’” effect on WTO institutions and 
legal functions, it cannot holistically or unequivocally define China as a “NMEs” nor can it treat 
“NME” as a monolithic term. Within this definitional ambiguity and diversity in bilateral NME 
treatment arises the first, and perhaps least explored, problem posed by non-capitalistic country 
involvement in the WTO. Over 30 WTO member countries already grant China de jure “market-
economy status” (MES), but the United States and the EU — arguably the two most powerful 
and sophisticated entities in dispute settlement — have not granted China this label.34 As 
explained below, complexities in defining “non-market economy” contribute to this largely 
arbitrary and political designation, and may affect the extent to which NME status is, in practice, 
used effectively or even enforceable at all.  
This thesis uses the terms “market economy” and “capitalist economy” interchangeably, 
and a discussion of the reasoning behind this choice, for a topic involving international 
economics and the WTO in particular, is warranted. Harvard economist Bruce Scott presents a 
comprehensive definition of capitalism as “an economic system where private actors are allowed 
to own and control the use of property in accord with their own interests, and where the invisible 
hand of the pricing mechanism coordinates supply and demand in markets in a way that is 
automatically in the best interests of society.”35 He then explains his own paper’s description of 
capitalism as a category of political-economic organization, writing:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The notorious “double remedies” case, initiated by China in 2008 and concluded in 2011, 
focuses on the problem of imposing simultaneous AD duties and CVDs on industries in non-
market economies. Difficulties arise in parsing out dumping actions and subsidy effects from an 
SOE because, to some extent, government subsidization of industry is an inherent characteristic  
of NME and because an NME can subsidize an SOE while that SOE is also dumping.  
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“Capitalism…[is] a system of indirect governance for economic relationships, 
where all markets exist within institutional frameworks that are provided by 
political authorities, i.e. governments…capitalism is a three level system much 
like any organized sports. Markets occupy the first level, where the competition 
takes place; the institutional foundations that underpin those markets are the 
second; and the political authority that administers the system is the third.”36 
 
These two definitions offered by Scott suggest that there is more to a capitalist economy 
than the determination of prices based on market forces of supply and demand. However, the 
determination of prices based on such market forces is an inseparable feature of a capitalist 
economy. A market economy is not always a full-blown capitalist economy, but a capitalist 
system always has market economy. That said, for the sake of trade remedies cases, pricing 
based on supply and demand is all that matters. The political institutions inherent to a capitalist 
country are irrelevant when considering whether or not a state (or a customs union, in the case of 
the E.U.) economy is market-based by the standards of the WTO. In the words of one 
interviewee, “the WTO is not a club of democracies” and “the political character of the 
members…is not relevant.”37 When discussing the “global capitalist economy,” this thesis 
focuses on just that: the economy.  Countries, and an international system like the WTO, are 
referred to as capitalist if they are market-based, regardless of their espousal (or rejection) of the 
political or governmental components of a comprehensive definition of capitalism.  
Scott does not argue that government regulation of the economy disqualifies a country 
from capitalist classification. In fact, he considers that reception of the capitalist label requires 
the existence of effective government management of and support for the evolution of the 
country’s markets.38 Still, a strict textual analysis of Scott’s definitions suggests that even 
Western European countries and the United States cannot even be considered fully capitalist or 
marketized economies as not all markets in these countries exist in a “system of indirect 
governance” by political officials.39 In a pure capitalist economy, the only goods provided (and 
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thus only markets controlled) by the government are “public goods such as national defense” and 
internal law and order.40 More flexible and realistic definitions of pure capitalism would include 
“basic education” as a public good administered by the government in such an economy.41 No 
country on earth meets these strict qualifications for capitalism/marketization, as even in highly 
capitalist economies such as that of the U.S., for example, the government controls the allocation 
of certain goods, such as food and housing, through welfare programs. The United States also 
subsidizes its exporting producers of agricultural products, which, in the international economic 
context, means it tampers with pure markets as well. To be sure, neither China nor Viet Nam 
maintain economies in which prices are as determined by supply and demand as they are in the 
West. Precise classification of China, Viet Nam, or any other country is somewhat qualitative 
and subjective, as no pure nonmarket economy or pure market economy exists and thus all 
countries in the WTO fall somewhere on market economy-NME spectrum. This thesis’ 
exploration of this problem of the spectrum supports the argument that “NME” is just as political 
(if not more political) of a label as it is a legitimate economic one.  
Regardless of varying nuances in definition, the purpose of non-market classifications 
remains the same: to clarify that “domestic prices cannot be used as a reference point” in trade 
remedy cases because the prices are affected by government subsidization, government price 
setting, or excessive currency manipulation.42 Since this paper considers how the participation of 
China (and Viet Nam) influenced applied definitions of NME, this section details the defined 
components of a “non-market economy” according to trade law before 2001. The first 
multilateral insinuation that an economy exhibiting non-market characteristics could participate 
in the institutionalized international trading system came in an Interpretive Note to the GATT 
added by Czechoslovakia during a 1954-1955 review of the treaty.43 Wolfrum et al. (2008) 
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unpack the note and determine that it contains “three essential criteria” recognized as hindrances 
to non-discriminatory, liberalized international trade.44 According to the Note text and as 
reiterated by Wolfrum et al., the criteria are as follows:  
1. “A country which has a complete or substantially complete monopoly of its trade” 
2. “All domestic prices are fixed by the State” 
 
3. “A strict comparison with domestic prices in such a country may not always be 
appropriate.”45 
Before beginning a more in-depth analysis of the Note, it is interesting to mention that 
scholarship disagrees on myriad aspects of the Note’s language, even including the meaning of 
the word “comparison.” Wolfrum et al. assume that this refers to a comparison struck between 
domestic prices in a foreign economy and export prices of that same economy.46 Thorstensen et 
al, however, argues that this language refers to “price comparability between market and 
centrally planned economies.”47 Though Wolfrum’s side appears to be correct considering the 
methodology of calculating dumping margins, this ambiguity raises an important philosophical 
point. Who is to say that the prices of one country and another country, regardless of those 
countries’ political economies, should be comparable? Are differing prices simply indicative of a 
monopolistically competitive international market? Most importantly, should engagement in the 
competitive pricing that underpins a “global capitalist economy” be denied to countries that, 
internally, subvert the political and governmental components of capitalism?  
The Interpretive Note lacks concrete methods for handling this puzzle of non-
comparability.48 In his the analysis of these provisions, Wolfrum argues that for “special 
difficulties” to arise in an attempt to compare domestic and export prices to detect dumping, the 
third criterion must (rather than may) be fulfilled. In other words, countries can possess 
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characteristics 1 and 2 without possessing characteristic 3.49 There are two possible utilitarian 
interpretations of this dynamic: 1) a country cannot qualify as this embryonic form of NME for 
the purposes of AD cases without possessing all three traits or 2) a country need only fulfill 
criterion 3.  Like post-2001 NME classification, the Interpretive Note intended to provide the 
(abstract) opportunity for AD cases to function without direct export/domestic price comparison. 
It is the implementable end (non-price comparability) not the descriptive means (criteria 1 and 2) 
that matter in the Interpretive Note. In this primitive definition, attention to constructing an 
eventual toolkit to handle NMEs in the WTO is evident; however, there seems to be less concern 
for requiring certain nuanced and internal political-economic characteristics to distinguish some 
economies, in practice, from economies that meet some nebulous and conceptual capitalist 
benchmark. The lack of adamantly required characteristics for NME status, in the rhetorical 
sense, allows for the possibility that future hybrid countries (enter China) could fill a liminal 
space in which NME status is ill-fitting but still the only non-capitalist option.  
The agreement establishing the WTO did not include a definition of non-market economy 
or even the direct mention of such a term, even though Chinese accession negotiations were well 
underway.50 In a 1984 Department of Commerce trade remedy case involving wire-rod from 
Czechoslovakia, USDOC defined a non-market economy as one in which planning rather than 
market forces determine the allocation of resources.51 In the most comprehensive US definition 
of NME provided by the Department of State, the Soviet Union is listed as the prime historical 
example.52 This entry in State’s Glossary of Trade insists that an NME’s government touches all 
corners of the economy: “production targets, prices, costs, investment allocations, raw materials, 
labor, international trade, and most other economic aggregates.”53 The U.S. Code criteria for a 
non-market economy generally follow the Department of State criteria. The major U.S. laws that 
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deal with comparable price determinations from non-market economies determine NMEs to exist 
according to “the extent to which” government intervention exists (the positive existence and 
magnitude of socialistic factors), rather than the extent to which it is absent.54 The U.S. laws 
suggest that an NME government must intervene in all of the aforementioned economic arenas. 
However, the state could intervene in some of those arenas to a miniscule degree and still qualify 
as an NME.  
The European Union does not have “a clear definition of NME” based on existing 
economic characteristics, but rather maintains a list of non-WTO members deemed to be non-
capitalist.55 Unlike the U.S., the EU understands market economies through an extensive test that 
considers the positive existence of capitalistic factors.356 In the U.S. case, it is difficult to 
establish the maximum quantifiable level or type of government intervention that bars a country 
from non-market economy classification. Since the U.S. definition offers no quantifiable 
benchmarks, there is room for the U.S. to grant NME status to an ambiguous or mostly 
marketized country. Certainly, the lack of quantifiable benchmarks facilitates the fact that the 
U.S. is still able to label China as an NME.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 To determine whether or not a country operates a “non-market economy,” the EU establishes a 
list of five political-economic factors in Article 2(7) of its Basic Anti-Dumping Regulation. The 
criteria are as follows: “A claim under subparagraph  (b) must be made in writing and contain 
sufficient evidence that the producer operates under market economy conditions, that is if: 1) 
decisions of firms regarding prices, costs and inputs, including for instance raw materials, cost of 
technology and labor, output, sales and investment, are made in response to market signals 
reflecting supply and demand, and without significant State interference in this regard, and costs 
of major inputs substantially reflect market values, 2) firms have one clear set of basic 
accounting records which are independently audited in line with international accounting 
standards and are applied for all purposes, 3) the production costs and financial situation of firms 
are not subject to significant distortions carried over from the former non-market economy 
system, in particular in relation to depreciation of assets, other write-offs, barter trade and 
payment via compensation of debts, 4) the firms concerned are subject to bankruptcy and 
property laws which guarantee legal certainty and stability for the operation of firms, and 5) 
exchange rate conversions are carried out at the market rate” (Official Journal of the European 
Union, Council Regulation (EC) No. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009).  
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In U.S. law, after already receiving the NME classification, the label is harder to shake. 
But in E.U. law, the issue is not shedding NME status but rather exhibiting elements of 
capitalism. The E.U. law pinpoints NMEs by process of elimination, or in other words by 
clarifying which countries exhibit capitalist characteristics and then placing all other countries in 
the NME basket. The E.U. definition does not provide quantifiable benchmarks nor include the 
phrase “the extent to which.” Though these EU provisions do not mention China or Viet Nam as 
NMEs, the EU still treats these countries as such based on the guidelines in their particular 
accession protocols.57 However, Chinese NME status for antidumping purposes is up for 
reevaluation at the end of 2016. The E.U. law, based on the un-quantified existence of 
capitalistic factors rather than the equally qualitative extent to which a government intervenes, 
may prove beneficial for China, since China does exhibit some capitalist factors but still retains 
significant government intervention.  
In fact, Argentina and other countries that have already granted market economy status to 
China use, verbatim, the same checklist used by the EU.58 Unlike the EU’s criteria, Argentina’s 
checklist notes that the list of factors “is not exhaustive, and the implementing authority may 
request such other evidence as it deems relevant.”59 That said, this phenomenon supports the idea 
that it is and will likely be easier for China to shed E.U.-based NME classifications that the U.S. 
classification. That countries granting China MES and countries maintaining China’s NME 
classification use the same NME criteria supports this thesis’ argument that NME status is a 
political statement more so than a technically accurate economic safeguard.  
As the Swedish National Board of Trade argues, many of these definitions were 
established during an era in which “there was a clear divide between economies following the 
ideas of market-based economics and those which followed the idea of central planning.”60 
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Thorstensen et al. (2013) note that the Working Party Report on the Accession of China 
designates China as a “Socialist Market Economy” that “bears characteristics of both market and 
non-market economies.”61 Despite this sophisticated Working Party argument, the Department of 
Commerce and most other WTO member government’s agencies only allow for two possible 
classifications, market economy or non-market economy, for trade remedies purposes.62 As 
explored in the literature and expounded upon in the findings, this thesis shows why this 
established binary causes trouble for certain members (particularly the NMEs themselves) and 
for actual WTO institutions.63 At least in practice in the international trading context, rigid 
political-economic definitions no longer exist, and thus, this binary could undermine the legal 
accuracy and general rules-based nature of the dispute system, which remains the most prized 
component of the WTO.  
 For import measures and AD/CVD cases brought before the WTO dispute settlement 
body (DSB), complainants must show that “rapidly” increasing importation (“either absolutely or 
relatively”) of the defendants underpriced products are and have been “a significant cause of 
material injury” to domestic markets.64 Injury, according to the WTO, occurs when there has 
been “significant price undercutting by the dumped imports as compared with the price of a like 
product of the importing Member” and this serves to “depress prices to a significant degree or 
prevent price increases, which otherwise would have occurred, to a significant degree.”65 
Material injury of a domestic market contrasts with market “disruption,” which occurs either 
when a material injury is present or when the “threat of material injury” arises.66 This definition 
is specifically used to legitimate the use of the China Safeguard and is stipulated in the Protocol 
on the Accession of the People’s Republic of China.67 The loose concept of threat is a tenuous 
requirement that undermines the rules-based system, as is discussed in the literature review. 
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However, this thesis does not offer additional analysis of the “threat” provision, as it has been 
explored quite a bit. Its mention serves as another piece of evidence towards the consideration 
that allowing China entry into the WTO led to a series of legally shaky and controversial rules.  
 Since Chinese participation undoubtedly affected the definitions of state-owned 
enterprise (SOE) and public body used in WTO dispute settlement, detailed here are the 
definitions of these entities that existed in the WTO context before Chinese participation affected 
the definition. As will be explained in the findings section, both arguments from the parties and 
the panelists in relevant trade remedies cases against China contributed to a more sophisticated 
and workable, or perhaps a more convoluted, definition of “public body.” This thesis provides 
original analysis of the relevant WTO jurisprudence to determine how and why certain WTO 
define “public body” differently. The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM), Article 1 states that a subsidy constitutes a “financial contribution by a 
government or any public body within the territory of a Member [government].”68 This definition 
precludes a distinction between outlawed subsidies, such as subsidies for exporters, and 
permitted subsidies, such as those that bolster domestic industries without “adversely affect[ing] 
other [WTO] members.”69 This explanation is the only one given in the SCM Agreement 
regarding the term “public body.”70 In subsequent disputes, the DSB and AB would resort to 
extrapolation of the terms “government” and “state” in the International Law Commission 
Article on State Responsibility in order to form a nascent definition of “public body.”71 The 
USDOC, as it argued in subsequent trade remedies cases involving Chinese subsidies, supports 
defining a “public body” as an “entity controlled by a government via majority state ownership,” 
without any requirement that the entity perform governmental functions or hold and wield 
“governmental authority.”72 Contrastingly, as replicated in its argument in a trade remedies case 
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involving China, Brazil asserts that, by definition, a “public body” must have the ability to 
perform “typical governmental functions and [exercise] the authority inherent to such 
functions.”73 This 2014 case, entitled United States – Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China, as well as an earlier AD/CVD cases involving concerns over the definition 
of “public body,” will be discussed in Sections V and VI in greater detail.  
 
SECTION IV: CASS AND JACKSON 
One of the first prominent international trade scholars to discuss China’s effect on the 
WTO was John Jackson in 2001. Jackson postulated about China’s future effect on the 
organization in the March before Chinese accession. In his article, Jackson wrote: 
“There is the accession process itself. What has China’s accession process perhaps 
already done to the WTO? ...There is the question of…the dispute settlement system 
and its impact on the China/WTO relationship and vice versa…[there] is the question 
of China and its diplomacy in the WTO; that is, China as a leader of diplomacy with 
the accompanying coalition, attitudes towards decision-making, allocation of decision-
making as a matter of allocating power between the international and national levels, 
and the question of sovereignty. Finally…the institutional problems for the 
WTO…there are…150 or 200 items on various lists of suggested reforms to the WTO 
dispute settlement system…the broad question is: what is going to be China’s role in 
these various reforms?74  
 
Also in 2001, Deborah Cass hypothesized that in certain situations, Chinese participation 
would further the constitutionalization of international trade law.75 By “constitutionalization,” 
Cass means the organization of international trade law into one coherent and legitimate 
framework of WTO-based law.76 This requires that WTO law to be considered not only the 
preeminent law of trade, but also a coherent and cumulative system of law. Two vectors upon 
which to assess the relationship between political-economic diversity in the WTO and the 
constitutionalization of trade law are 1) the extent to which NME participation has affected the 
use of legal precedent and jurisprudent cross-reference in dispute settlement and 2) the extent to 
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which one can develop comprehensive answers to new problems in trade disputes within the 
WTO legal context.  
The hypotheses of Cass and Jackson served as the framework through which this thesis 
conceptualized the potential “changes” to the WTO of Chinese participation. These postulations 
help pinpoint the important (and perhaps most malleable) WTO institutions and the intellectual 
and pragmatic shortcomings of international economic law (its potentially in-coherent, non-
constitutional nature, lack of de jure stare decisis, etc.). Most importantly, though, Cass and 
Jackson’s work provided clues about where to look for China/NME-induced changes to the 
multilateral trading system. Cass and Jackson precipitate their arguments on the assumption that 
Chinese participation would certainly change and indeed has changed the institutions and 
functions of the WTO to a significant extent. This thesis examines how the WTO was changed 
by Chinese participation, but also considers that certain WTO institutions and norms remain just 
as effective as they were pre-2001, or perhaps have even been strengthened. Though the author 
of this thesis hesitates to make holistic statements about the effect of China and other NMEs on 
the WTO, her research shows that, in many institutional and cultural arenas, the WTO stands 
unwaveringly operative and legitimate in the midst of this political-economic diversity. The 
WTO’s legal ambiguity and lack of effectiveness mentioned in Keohane’s 2002 analysis may 
exist, but even after this potential and slight degradation, Keohane remains correct that the WTO 
is a nonpareil international institution respected by its members.   
 
SECTION V: LITERATURE REVIEW 
Little scholarship exists on the effect of NME participation in the WTO. However, some 
scholars have explored China’s influence, and a few scholars analyze the influence of one 
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notable WTO case involving Viet Nam and the United States. Bown and McCullough consider 
two aspects of WTO law affected by Chinese accession, examine the effect of Chinese accession 
on countries’ use of WTO forums, and discuss the perceived international legitimacy of the 
WTO itself after Chinese inclusion. They note that use of the “China Safeguard” translates into a 
“strain on the reciprocity-based trading system” and the MFN law in the WTO.77 The authors 
define “reciprocity” as emphasized in the GATT/WTO as the norm that when “major players in 
the system” negotiate, they maintain a “balance of concessions” in terms of trade liberalization 
and market access.78 Zhuang explains that countries only have to claim that the goods in question 
are causing a domestic “market disruption,” but not a full injury or even potential injury when 
instituting the Safeguard.79 Wu also emphasizes this low standard of “market disruption” that 
countries must meet.80 This ambiguity and thus carte blanche could give complaining countries 
even more disproportionate power and further undermine reciprocity in the WTO.  
Bown and McCullough’s case documentation suggests that as Chinese presence in the 
WTO increased, the U.S. relied on domestic trade courts as much or more than the WTO dispute 
settlement mechanism (DSM) to deal with Chinese trade issues outside the subject matter of 
WTO law.81 This suggests that political-economic diversification sent a signal to the U.S. that 
WTO dispute settlement would be more difficult. Perhaps, China’s accession signaled a 
deterioration of WTO functionality and institutional benefit to the Western developed countries, 
who fashioned the underlying GATT according to their own interests. On the other hand, in 
detailing China’s extensive use of the DSM and eagerness to sit on cases as a third party, Zhuang 
shows that China respects and trusts the WTO system despite the politically disadvantageous 
provisions in its accession protocol.82 However, this increased reliance on the WTO can also be 
viewed as a symptom of the NME classification retained by China.83 Urdinez and Masiero 
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conduct a quantitative study of Chinese WTO cases and determine that, since 2001, countries 
that have already awarded China “market economy status” (MES) have “initiate[d] fewer 
antidumping investigations than countries still treating China as an NME.”84 However, Urdinez 
and Masiero’s work also shows that some countries, such as Brazil and Argentina, granted MES 
to China de jure but still use dumping margin calculation methods and other tools that treat 
China as an NME.85 Puccio goes as far as to say that Brazil only announced China’s MES and 
never took any steps to enforce the status at all.86 
 Ji examines the specific techniques used to calculate dumping margins on products from 
non-market economies.87 He defines the “analog method” and explains that the two biggest 
WTO economies — the United States and the EU — use different methods of choosing analog 
countries and are not required to share their processes with the targeted NME.88 Ji notes that the 
EU does not clearly define “NME” and he questions the legality of the European methods.89 Ji 
explains that EU NME “criteria” fail to constitute a comprehensive definition because they 
specify what the economy in a country must not be to qualify, rather than what it must be.90  
Ji argues that these discrepancies increase “the possibility of affirmative findings in an 
anti-dumping case when in fact the price exceeds the cost of production,” giving the 
complainants disproportionate power over a respondent NME’s fate.91 He explains that the 
analog method often compares China to more developed countries and overestimates incidents of 
dumping as opposed to market-based pricing.92 A review of scholarship from Puccio (2015), as 
well as the U.S. Government Accountability Office’s 2006 study of American anti-dumping 
calculation methodology vis-à-vis China adds to Ji’s argument; these sources contend that “in 
general, NME methodologies [used] to calculate normal value have proven to lead to higher anti-
dumping duties.”93 Thorstensen et al. analyze the political implications of NME labeling and 
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dumping margin calculation methods. Like Ji, the authors discuss that while China may 
generally be an NME, certain individual firms and industries exhibit stronger indications of 
capitalist operation than China as a whole.94 Cases against more market-oriented Chinese 
industries could disproportionately hurt said industries if methods used to calculate dumping 
margins or subsidy levels consider the Chinese economy as a whole and not the idiosyncrasies of 
the industry.  
Ahn and Lee argue that up until recently, NME classification and methodologies made it 
possible for market economies to levy CVDs and ADs on NMEs at the same time, even though 
this can cause a WTO-prohibited “double remedy” to occur.95 Simply put, a “double remedy” 
occurs when Ads and CVDs overlap, causing a double-taxation of sorts on the foreign products. 
Beshkar and Chilton analyze the implications of one specific WTO case between the United 
States and China in which China challenged a U.S. law “stipulating that the application of CVD 
law to NMEs starting in 2006 was legal.”96 Focusing on how this case affected ideas of DSM 
capacity and procedural norms, the authors contend that it affected 1) norms regarding 
complainants’ invocation of specific GATT articles breached 2) understanding of the importance 
and use of legal precedent and 3) philosophical and literal relationships between WTO law and 
municipal (national) trade laws and policies.97 Further, the authors complement Ahn and Lee in 
discussing this case’s implication that the AB could re-legalize simultaneous AD and CVD 
imposition using NME calculation methods for both.98 
When surveying the literature on political-economic diversity in the WTO and the DSM, 
it is worth discussing Vietnamese participation to understand the new legal considerations that 
come with NME status. Viet Nam’s most notable case in the DSM, brought against the US, first 
involved a Vietnamese complaint against “zeroing,” or the US practice of changing any negative 
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dumping margins (or over-pricings) into zeros.99 Viet Nam complained that the United States’ 
use of zeroing with regard to certain imports of Vietnamese shrimp violated the WTO Anti-
Dumping Agreement, and the Panel agreed with Viet Nam.100 Viet Nam also brought more 
convoluted complaints that have specific considerations with regards to NME status in later 
reviews of US-Shrimp.101 The proceedings of US-Shrimp administrative reviews, as Broude and 
Moore note, illuminate some arcane but still pervasive shortcomings of WTO legal texts.102  
Viet Nam argued that the United States did not sample a sufficient number of shrimp-
exporting enterprises to calculate the “all others” dumping margin.103 The complainant against an 
especially large foreign industry may calculate an “all others” margin from a sample of 
enterprises and then impose that rate on the exporters for which individual data is not 
considered.104  De jure, “sampling” is the exception to the general rule of using individual data 
from as many individual exporters as possible.105 Broude and Moore mention that in US-Shrimp, 
Viet Nam criticized the U.S. for using sampling as frequently as if this was the general rule and 
collecting broad firm-by-firm data as if this was the anomalistic method. 106 Further, the 
Vietnamese critique here targeted USDOC practice not only in cases with NMEs, but across the 
board.107 This suggests that the US misapplied WTO law for some time — exposing the 
shortcomings of WTO legal language and the Anti-Dumping Agreement as a DSM sub-
institution — and that factoring NMEs into the mix hardly made a difference about this.  
The Panel rejected Viet Nam’s claim about insufficient sampling in the initial 
investigation.108 Broude and Moore rationalize the Panel’s decision by noting that as the number 
of relevant exporters in an investigated market increases, so does the “cost of conducting an 
investigation.”109 That said, the Panel’s decision suggests the WTO’s recognition that providing 
comprehensive and holistic data from a foreign industry, especially if it is a large industry, is 
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difficult regardless of the political economies of parties to a dispute. Various interviewed experts 
contended that evidentiary standards in the DSM remain intact despite NME participation, 
implying that evidentiary standards were high quality both before and after NME accessions. 
Broude and Moore insinuate that since problems with sampling exist regardless, evidentiary 
collection processes and thus standards were lacking even before the NMEs joined. 
Viet Nam also complained (and the Panel ultimately supported this claim) that the United 
States levied unfairly high dumping duties on state-controlled exporters.110 In fact, the US chose 
not to impose the “all others” rate on state-owned shrimp enterprises but instead imposed a rate 
over five times as high.111 Even in AD cases involving non-market economies, the “all others” 
rate should apply to all exporters in an industry. Despite the intuitive presumption that 
underpricing would be more pronounced among firms owned or mostly controlled by 
government planners, WTO jurisprudence suggests that complainants against NMEs should still 
impose the general “all others” rate on state-owned enterprises as well.112  
Wu contemplates the effect of China’s participation on the norms of dispute settlement, 
the perceived legitimacy of WTO law, and members’ ability to adhere to WTO rulings. The 
author considers that holding China to impossible standards of marketization, whether in 
negotiations or as a prerequisite for certain legal treatment in dispute settlement, delegitimizes 
said standards and thus the broader WTO advocacy of marketization and trade liberalization.113 
Additionally, the complex and unique requirements placed on China for accession contain a 
significant amount of legal and economic ambiguity that caused a proliferation of convoluted 
disputes brought against China.114 Wu argues that the DSM’s traditional methods of legal 
interpretation are insufficient to handle cases involving China.115 Last, Wu suggests that China’s 
asymmetric concessions (and their uses in dispute settlement) subvert the idea of “non-
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discrimination” in the WTO such that these concessions signal the need for a revamped and 
particularized definition of “non-discrimination.”116  However, like Zhuang, Wu shows that 
China is a top performer in the WTO in terms of compliance with DSB/AB decisions and new 
rules.117  This implies that any remaining rhetoric targeting China as a tough case or a tricky 
economic and diplomatic partner in the WTO is not only unfounded, but also perhaps 
discriminatory and politically motivated. In an article discussing the WTO as the main organ of 
the “world capitalist economy system” and the experience of Russia in the WTO, Pilipenko 
(2015) contends that “the WTO is the organization that is not of political but exclusively of 
economic nature.”118 Pilipenko’s analysis also insinuates that there is no place for international 
politics in the WTO, or that issues more political than economic in nature would never arise 
within the context of this international organization. The results presented later from interviews 
with experts show that this is not the case at all. International politics undoubtedly matter, and 
often matter more than pure economic interests, in the WTO and do inform the decisions of 
WTO members. This plays out in the realms of negotiations, dispute settlement, and even in 
accession processes themselves. As considered throughout this thesis, NME status is the 
quintessential subversion of the idea that economic realities always determine outcomes in the 
WTO. 
One interesting phenomenon related to Chinese participation involves the discrepancies 
between China’s perception of its own behavior in the WTO and the perceptions of China held 
by other members. In a short article about Chinese effect on WTO institutions, Scott Kennedy 
(2011) argues: “the gap between China’s own self-image and that of foreign observers, 
especially in advanced industrialized economies, appears to be growing by the day.”119 In the 
beginning, China viewed itself as the reluctant victim of harsh accession conditions; as will be 
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discussed later, this perspective greatly affected China’s strategy in early Doha.120 The other 
WTO members that conduct significant trade with China hardly agree; Kennedy notes that many 
of these countries consider the Chinese Accession Protocol a “sweetheart deal.”121  According to 
Kennedy, Chinese officials constructed an underdog narrative in which China joined the WTO 
while “struggling to understand the basic the basic rules and procedures,” but now China exhibits 
sophistication and skill in “the regular committee work, high-level negotiations, and dispute 
settlement system.”122  But this teleological narrative lacks evidentiary support; the last findings 
subsection details how China uniquely used the WTO as a domestic political tool. This usage 
marks perhaps the first time that a country as powerful as China exhibited excitement about what 
an international organization could do for it rather than what it could do to influence the 
organization. In short, the humility and cosmopolitan enthusiasm with which China approached 
its own role in the WTO and international economic community respectively ironically served as 
the catalysts that caused China to change how the international community understands the 
WTO.  
Zhuang, other scholars, and many experts interviewed for this thesis would attribute 
much of this developed prowess to China’s high rate of third-party participation in the DSM. In 
fact, China has sat on 129 cases as a third party observer or vocal commentator.123  Other large 
members and members with significant trade flows boast similar statistics. The most active third 
parties, with over 100 cases each, are Japan (159), the European Union (155), the United States 
(130), China (129), India (116), Canada (110), and South Korea (101).124 However, all of these 
members except for China acceded to the WTO and the DSM on January 1, 1995.125 Below are 
the average third party cases-per-year figures for the aforementioned members; the figure show 
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that China raced to experience as much of the DSM as possible and catch up with other large 
members.  
Member Third Party Observation: Cases Per Year (1 
January 1995 to 1 February 2016) 
Japan 7.54 
European Union 7.35 
United States 6.17 
China (Participation Begins on 10 November 2001) 9.07 
India 5.50 
Canada 5.22 
South Korea 4.79 
 
As Bown and Crowley assert, “the most radical change introduced by the new China 
Safeguard is the weakened evidentiary criterion that WTO members must satisfy in order to 
legally impose a new barrier to Chinese trade.”126 Less explored is how NME participation has 
affected the evidentiary standards to which DSM panels hold parties in AD and CVD cases. 
Quantitative data on the evidentiary standards affected by both the Safeguard and trade remedies 
calculation for NMEs is difficult to compile due to the confidential nature of many evidentiary 
submissions to the WTO. This thesis addresses this phenomenon as thoroughly as possible given 
the constraint of confidentiality and presents all relevant information, as presented to the author 
in interviews and as found in legal research. One would assume that the proverbial carte blanche 
given to complainants when calculating dumping margins for China or any other NME, as well 
as the ease with which a country could institute the China Safeguard (for the first twelve years of 
Chinese involvement) has eroded the standards of evidence in the DSM. Though any answer to 
this question is largely informed by experiences and opinions of experts, synthesis of discussions 
with these experts suggest that the record is mixed and highly political.  
On the macroeconomic level, authors of the 2007 WTO World Trade Report (some of 
whom were interviewed for this thesis project) pose questions about China’s integration into the 
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global market economy that consider how WTO accession may be more of a political act than an 
economic undertaking.127 Stated in the report is the “idea that signing a trade agreement can be 
used as a signaling device” and that “WTO membership provided a potent symbol of China’s 
continuing ‘opening up’ to the rest of the world.”128 One must wonder then, how much of the 
boom in trade flows to and from China in the 21st century resulted from the domestic 
macroeconomic and political changes required for WTO membership, or the announcement of 
membership in an of itself. It may be hard to arrive at a quantifiable, definitive answer to this 
question of political strategy vs. macroeconomic reality, and the World Trade Report concedes 
that this question is difficult to answer. The Brookings Institution’s Paul Blustein suggests that 
the political signal of membership did have its own marked effect by writing that “China’s WTO 
membership made many foreign firms much more comfortable about investing in the country 
and using it as a prime base for their manufacturing operations.”129 Interviews with trade 
lawyers, political economists, and former WTO officials aim to shed additional light on how the 
international trade community would answer this question based on perceptions of and trends 
regarding China’s participation and behavior in the WTO.  
 
SECTION VI: INTERVIEW METHOD AND ANALYTICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The author interviewed 12 international trade experts including lawyers and economic 
consultants, Secretariat members, and former US government officials. All 12 interviewees 
participated in “first round” interviews or in direct email correspondence, and 3 participated in 
further interviews which yielded more in-depth and often less public information. Interviewees 
and other contacts also engaged in regular correspondence in order to provide further content and 
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guidance in the interpretation of WTO legal language. All interviewees were asked the same set 
of questions in the first round. These questions were as follows: 
 
1. Does China instigate more “as such” cases than “as applied” cases, proportionally 
speaking, than other NMEs or than other developing countries? Do you think this 
trend relates to either of the aforementioned classifications or another 
characteristic of China? How has this affected the interpretive strategies, 
procedures, and legal functions of the DSB and AB?  
2. Has NME participation led the AB to adopt a more meta-legal function? In other 
words, has the AB become more of a rule-maker, more activist, and more 
concerned with assessing the integrity and legality of WTO laws themselves as 
opposed to assessing the evidence presented or methods used in the DSB hearing?  
3. To what extent did increased trade flows to and from China result from China 
adhering to the requirements in the Protocol? China has yet to fully complete 
implementation of these requirements; to what extent was joining the WTO 
simply a political signal that led to more trade flows, regardless of internal 
political and economic reforms?  
4. Why have China and Viet Nam been rather silent on the impeding potential 
change to NME status? Why are trade associations and industries with a stake in 
the change in status being silent as well?  
5. How has China behaved in the Doha Round? Does it “lead from behind” and let 
other developing countries lead advocacy for the maintenance of agricultural 
subsidies?  
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6. To what extent are the different experiences of China, Viet Nam and Russia 
reflective of China’s unique initiative to be an active third party in dispute 
settlement? Why have Russia and Viet Nam, and perhaps especially Russia, not 
taken on similar roles?  
7. How has the use of the China Safeguard and a variety of NME methodologies for 
AD/CVD purposes affected evidentiary standards and the allocation of the burden 
of proof in dispute settlement?  
8. How does China view the DSM, its procedures, and its accepted methods of legal 
interpretation? Does China act the way it does out of genuine respect or a desire 
to gain a purely strategic “upper hand” in the multilateral trading system?  
 
The author also conducted original analysis of the following cases in which China acted as 
complainant:  
a. EC – Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners from 
China - DS397 
 
b. EC – Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Footwear (Leather) from China – 
DS405  
 
c. US- Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) (DSB and AB) 
(2008-2011) – DS379  
 
d. US- Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China – DS437  
 
e. United States – Anti Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades from 
China - DS422 
 
f. United States – Certain Methodologies and Their Application to Anti-Dumping 
Proceedings in China – DS471 
 
g. US- Preliminary Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duty Determinations on 
Coated Free Sheet Paper from China (in consultations) - DS368  
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h. United States – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Products 
from China (double remedies case) – DS449  
 
Cases (A), (C), (D), (F), and (H) form a set of cases in which AD duties were imposed by 
the United States or European Union, and in which certain defendant firms received separate 
rates, individual treatment rates, or general NME rates. The section on dispute settlement 
presents the product specifics4, margins and methodological considerations of the United States 
or the European Union in each case. This findings subsection then juxtaposes the levels of 
marketization of each industry as a whole by synthesizing statistical information about both 
private firms and state-owned enterprises in each industry. Next, an overall marketization 
analysis is provided for the relevant industries, as they exist in India, the most commonly chosen 
analog. Through the presentation of this data, the author opens a discussion of whether the 
specific Chinese industries targeted in WTO dispute settlement are in fact so significantly less 
marketized than the “market-based” industries to which they are compared in AD investigations. 
On the one hand, the targeted industries could be on par with analogous industries in India, 
suggesting that NME methodologies disproportionately hurt their Chinese targets. On the other 
hand, these industries could be on par with marketization levels in China as a whole, suggesting 
that NME methodologies do not have any unintended disproportionate victims. If the latter is the 
case, NME methodologies could still be discriminatory towards Chinese industry but without 
holding back industries that already perform according to WTO-championed, market-based 
principles.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 As explained in the dispute settlement findings, these products all fall within the aquaculture 
products and manufacturing sectors. Margins are considered against the backdrop of industry 
marketization rates and the marketization of relative industries in India. This offers insight into 
whether or not NME methodologies for these specific products in WTO cases hurts certain 
Chinese industries more than is technically and economically legitimate.  
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To tie case interpretation back to Cass’ predictions, this thesis examines elements of 
precedent, cross-connectivity and consistency present in these cases, and how these elements 
interacted with the cases’ focus on NME and public body definitions. Further, interviews 
illuminated the idea that legal language and methods of jurisprudential interpretation in the WTO 
are highly Western-biased and without regard for “quasi-Confucian” or other Eastern legal 
methods.130 This is kept in mind while conducting legal analysis. AB and DSB Panelists, as well 
as private lawyers with experience litigating before WTO Panels were asked more targeted and 
detailed questions about this Western bias. The implications of this are elaborated upon in the 
concluding pages.  
The author of this thesis recognizes the problematic lack of verifiability with regard to 
certain new information presented in this paper. Much of the presented findings originate from 
interviews with trade consultants and litigators that wished to remain anonymous. Some 
interviewees requested to remain off the record. Their testimonies are omitted from this thesis 
and simply served to inform the author’s original research. Finally, large amounts of the findings 
about Chinese negotiating techniques, Chinese impact on DSM legal procedures and interpretive 
methods, and Chinese regard for the WTO itself are based analysis and synthesis of testimony 
from people involved in trade negotiations and dispute settlement with China. Much of this 
information cannot be quantified or systematized simply because empirical data on these 
phenomena does not exist.  
  
SECTION VII: FINDINGS 
The content of the conducted interviews is organized and presented in accordance with 
the sub-institutions of the World Trade Organization itself. This section discusses China/NME 
influence on the Doha Round (the most recent diplomatic WTO sub-institution), the dispute 
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settlement mechanism (DSM), and lastly the other mechanisms of the WTO. In all sections, the 
author will discuss information particular to China’s influence as an NME, China’s influence as 
a developing country, and China’s influence as its own unique country, both politically and 
economically, regardless of these classifications. However, with regard to information presented 
about China’s influence as an NME, the author will also discuss findings with regard to NME 
status more generally and will include comparative analysis of China’s experience to that of the 
other NMEs, namely Russia and Viet Nam. The findings regarding China in WTO Rounds and 
committees mention the other BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and South Africa), but not 
as comparative examples to China. Rather, as will be shown, the BRICS are included to support 
the information presented about China’s experience in and influence on the Doha Round and 
WTO committees.  
 
CHINA IN THE DOHA ROUND 
The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations concluded with the establishment 
of the WTO and espousal of the GATT (the basis for previous trade rounds) as the new 
“umbrella treaty for trade in goods.” 131  Uruguay Round negotiators also completed the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).132 However, 
developing countries that participated in the Uruguay Round or joined later argued that the 
intellectual property protections granted by TRIPS would suffocate research and development 
efforts, and thus innovation-based economic growth, in developing countries.133 Interestingly, the 
criticism (from both developing countries and the international community in general) that 
negotiated patent protections will hurt their R&D and raise prices of vital medicines for people in 
poorer countries currently underpins opposition to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and seems to be 
a general sticking point for opponents of free trade agreements.134 Building off of these 
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grievances, in the same month of China’s accession, WTO members initiated the Doha Round of 
negotiations, which would focus on developing countries’ concerns such as trade in services, 
implementation of TRIPS, and agricultural subsidies.135  
Scholars and international trade law practitioners generally agree that at this point, the 
Doha Round has stagnated and will probably be officially terminated in the near future. On one 
hand, the proliferation of bilateral and regional free trade agreements (FTAs), such as the recent 
US FTA with Korea, the Trans-Pacific Partnership, or the TPP’s EU-US analog (the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership) has diverted international trade policymakers’ 
attention away from the WTO’s negotiations channels.136 On the other hand, the Doha Round 
arguably de facto failed on its own terms, due to stalemate and contention between multiple 
negotiators. As far as China’s influence on the Round, a synthesis of scholarship and original 
interviews suggests that, China can be blamed, in part, for the stagnation of the Round. American 
scholars and trade lawyers generally attribute the plurality of the blame for Doha failure, so to 
speak, on China for its own behaviors. While China’s behind-the-scenes and politically 
motivated actions did contribute to this stagnation, this thesis reframes that analysis, arguing that 
China’s simple, even if passive, existence within the Round, would have contributed on its own 
to stagnation. That said, China cannot be blamed for its “simple existence” in the Round. This 
thesis argues that the WTO’s decision to grant Chinese membership in concurrence with Round 
establishment, as well as the WTO’s decision to frame the Round as development-focused (due 
to the recent inclusion of China within the system) led to stagnation.  
The Doha Round has been a platform for the emergence and solidification of a 
developing country contingent in the WTO.137 As the story of Chinese participation in and 
influence on the Doha Round will show, in the Round, diplomatic alliances between developing 
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countries outweigh economically divergent interests that these developing countries bring to the 
negotiating table.138 This again refutes Pilipenko’s arguments that the WTO does not house 
institutions in which international political interplay determines outcomes more than economic 
interests do. Before going forward with this discussion, it is important to note that policy 
outcomes in WTO-level negotiations are surely influenced by the domestic political 
considerations of the negotiating countries, which are sometimes distinct from said countries’ 
domestic economic concerns. For example, Chinese scholars argue that the Chinese set of 
positions in the Doha Round emphasized the elimination or mitigation of tariffs on agricultural 
products “not because agricultural trade is crucial to the economy but because of the importance 
of the political stability of the farming population to Chinese society.”139 Still, supporting the 
agricultural sector certainly does not hurt the Chinese economy or run counter to domestic 
Chinese economic interests. This thesis attempts to broaden the understanding of “politicking in 
the WTO” by arguing that international political dynamics often overwhelm international 
economic relationships, and that the two are not always parallel. Further, one vignette of China’s 
notable behavior in Doha Round negotiations provides an example of this phenomenon. In this 
case, a desire to establish international symbolic affiliation with other large developing countries 
such as India trumped China’s specific domestic economic and domestic political considerations.  
In accepting massive domestic reforms and urging its population to learn as much about 
the WTO system as possible, China seemed, in the U.S. perspective at least, enthusiastic to 
contribute to Doha from the get-go.140 But scholars and international trade policy practitioners 
now consider that in the first years of the Doha Round, China remained even more passive and 
unengaged in negotiations than it has been in the later years of the Round.141 Two factors, one 
involving the then-recently completed Chinese accession process and one involving the subjects 
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of negotiation in early Doha, contributed to this potential passivity. First, Chinese officials still 
felt the weight of the massive internal reforms and concessions (such as the China Safeguard and 
NME status) made by exchange for membership in the WTO.142 Though scholars have devoted 
entire books to describing the concessions and reforms made by China in exchange for 
membership, it will suffice here to mention that those concessions are similar, either in economic 
effect or statutory and conceptual substance, to proposals presented in the early Doha 
negotiations.  
When a WTO member “binds” a tariff, they register the maximum tariff (the bound rate) 
with the WTO Secretariat.143 At this point, tariffs on this particular good may not exceed the 
bound rate in the relevant member country or customs union.144 However, WTO members often 
impose tariffs at rates considerably lower than the maximum potential rates registered in 
Geneva.145 The international trade policy community calls the difference between these “applied 
rates” and the bound rates “water.”146 It is in the interest of trading partners of China, for 
example, that China decreased its “water” levels because less potential movement in tariffs 
would provide exporters to China “greater policy security that import barriers will not easily be 
raised” and thus greater certainty in calculated trade-related economic projections.147 One 
interviewee explained that developed countries pushed the reduction of water in BRICS 
countries as a major intention of Doha negotiations. His estimates provided in interview 
responses place pre-Doha water levels for the BRICS’ tariffs in general at 8-25%.148 Further, he 
mentioned that the Doha water initiatives aimed to reduce these water levels to between 5-8%. If 
this interviewee’s generalizations are correct, and this thesis assumes that they are, the water 
levels for BRICS agricultural products leading into Doha were particularly massive. Calculations 
from Hufbauer, Schott and Wong (2010) suggest that Brazil and India maintained respective 
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water levels of 36.5% and a staggering 168.8% before any progress on water was made via 
Doha.149 China however, was required to reduce its water levels as part of the accession process. 
If we extrapolate upon the method offered by Zeng and Liang (2013) we find that in the 
accession process, China reduced its “bound rates on industrial products” to 9.2% and eliminated 
all water.150  This provided existent WTO members at the time of accession talks with greater 
confidence, even if only de jure, regarding the inability of China to wage effective safeguards on 
industrial imports from developed countries. Assessing this orthodox requirement of no water 
feeds into a normative analysis of the disproportionate harshness of the Chinese accession 
process, and helps to unpack whether hyper-strict conditions for Chinese membership had any 
effect on the diplomatic culture of the WTO and perceived appropriate uses of WTO-related and 
–based negotiations. The interviewees asked about historical tariff concessions could not say 
with certainty that any pre-2001 acceding countries made as drastic a concession as China’s “no 
water” requirements.151 That said, the main Doha Round expert implied in correspondence with 
the author that certain Russian concessions made in the accession process might be, by some 
interpretations, near those made by China.152  
Hufbauer et al. pinpoint the overall Chinese water level for agricultural products pre-
Doha but post-accession at 6.5%, which in relative terms, was hardly higher than the U.S. and 
EU levels and fell way below the average water levels for 22 cases calculated by the authors.153 
With regard to imports coming from other countries within the Doha coalition of developing 
nations, China maintained agricultural tariff water levels of just 3.4%, whereas India and Brazil 
had water levels of 130.7% and 42.8% respectively. In terms of agricultural tariffs and tariffs on 
imported products from other WTO members in more generally, China felt as though it had 
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already acquiesced to enough water reduction demands and was thus entitled to sit quietly in the 
early Doha negotiations.154  
To what extent can the normative claim that China conceded enough in the accession 
process be supported by the historical quantitative data? One could examine pre-accession and 
post-accession (but pre-Doha involvement) water levels in China to provide a quantitative 
answer to this question. This information is notoriously difficult to access due to the lack of 
transparency provided by the Chinese government with regard to economic and technical trade 
information before the completion of the accession process.155 This thesis can assess China’s 
claim by considering the extent to which tariff concessions are, both economically and politically 
speaking, particularly difficult for China to implement. As the interviewed Doha expert argued: 
“reducing tariffs was one of the easier things for China to do…much easier than eliminating 
myriad aspects of state intervention in the Chinese economy.”156 In economic terms, this seems 
obvious. Tariff reduction, de jure, requires simple technical changes to tariff schedules and in 
terms of implementation, requires notifying the WTO (to list new tariffs in the WTO schedule) 
and ensuring that trading partners are aware of the changes. But privatization of SOEs, 
universalization of trading licenses, and improvement of government transparency standards 
require, for example, elaborate plans for corporate organizational change, blueprints for 
transitions of corporate power, increased efficiency in export licensing and economic data 
collection central agencies. It seems that the tariff concessions were not arduous enough for 
China to invoke the argument that it conceded enough, at least from this angle. But as another 
interviewee argued, China initiated its own accession process despite the anxieties of the WTO 
membership, and it did so with enthusiasm and commitment to entering the system 
successfully.157 This dynamic granted existing membership the lion’s share of political capital in 
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the accession process, meaning that China lacked the negotiating power to whittle down the 
WTO-proposed concessions.158 From this view, China did acquiesce to significant demands pre-
Doha, as it squeezed relatively little compromise from the existing membership.  
The second reason, according to Paul Blustein of the Brookings Institution, for a lack of 
Chinese presence in early Doha was that China did not have “major interests at stake in the 
disputes that plagued the Round in its first few years.”159 Blustein explains that the initial 
contentious conversations involved the extension of WTO jurisdiction to issues of “corporate 
investment…government procurement, and US cotton subsidies.” 160  China refrained from 
assuming a leadership role on any topic.161 Instead, “other developing countries” championed the 
push for government procurement and corporate investment rules, and sub-Saharan African 
countries were the most vocal on issues of US cotton subsidization.162 In fact, the West African 
drafters of the Second Initiative in Favour of Cotton (submitted right before the 2003 Cancun 
Ministerial) criticized China as a cotton subsidizer whose actions were equivalent in scope and 
deleterious effect to those of the U.S. and E.U.163 Issues of investment and procurement fell 
within the context of the “Singapore Issues,” or a package of issues that were proposed by the 
European Union and other developed nations to be included on the Doha agenda; one major 
consideration within the Singapore Issue context was whether or not the WTO should or could 
have the authority to write the rules of these domains.164 China exhibited flexibility with regard 
to this legal consideration. 165  Aside from occasionally throwing its weight around with 
developing countries behind the scenes, China did not attempt to vocalize any new, oppositional, 
or particularly loud opinions about the legal scope and purposes of the WTO system.  
One instance of Chinese participation in the Doha Round that Blustein examines occurred 
during a July 2008 Ministerial Meeting in Geneva. Many Western academics argue that this 
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moment marks China’s increased participation, relevance, and oppositional behavior in the 
Round. Chinese and other East Asian scholars obviously push back against the ideas that this 
moment ruined progress in negotiations or that it signifies a change in Chinese interests and 
strategic reasoning. In his interview sessions, the international trade litigator with perhaps the 
most thorough knowledge of Doha Round history of any American lawyer interviewed, 
mentioned this 2008 meeting as a critical moment in China’s Doha presence. First, the WTO 
Director General at the time, Pascal Lamy, invited China to participate in an elite subgroup of 
negotiations (called the G7) with six other powerful and large economies, including India and the 
United States.166 At this Ministerial, India advocated to maintain subsidization of rural farmers 
and intended to resist intra-meeting initiatives for tariff reductions in order to protect its own 
unique domestic interests.167  Further, India sought to establish the guidelines for a safeguard 
mechanism against increased agricultural products from developing countries, and specifically 
wished to write the rules counter to the proposals of the other chief safeguard negotiator, the 
United States.168 India demanded Chinese support regarding subsidy maintenance and, given 
China’s status as a developing country, perhaps expected its support on the safeguard 
mechanism.169  In the initial negotiation interactions after this moment, Chinese behavior 
suggested to the rest of the G7 that it would remain uninvolved in these negotiations.170 
However, in a dramatic turn of events in late July, China decided to provide support for the 
Indian agricultural proposals and to vocally oppose U.S. positions and behaviors, which stunned 
U.S. trade policy practitioners.171 
To be sure, in 2008, agriculture accounted for 10.3% of Chinese GDP compared to 17.8% 
of Indian GDP.172 Further, China was already undergoing a decrease in GDP share of agricultural 
production, whereas India maintains a steady, comparable level of agricultural sectoral share 
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today.173 China’s interests in maintaining agricultural subsidization and mitigating the potential 
damage caused by developed countries’ safeguards on agricultural imports aligned with those of 
India. That said, in terms of pure economic policy, China’s stake in the matter was less 
significant.174 As a result, China was initially content to play the middleman between the U.S. 
and India on these issues, calling for import-increase rates at which safeguards could be 
employed that sat squarely between the U.S. proposed 40% rate and India’s proposed 15% 
rate.175 Also, as considered above, the Chinese “post-accession” complex regarding concessions 
already made led China to argue that it deserved the role of middleman and was not obligated, 
politically, to pick a side. China’s change of heart came from India’s last minute, non-public 
push for the establishment of a developing country political coalition, not from a change in 
China’s economic situation or China’s understanding of its domestic political-economic stakes in 
the matter. Since no notable progress on agricultural subsidies or other major development 
initiatives has been made since, it is fair to say that this coalition building worked, and it 
solidified a developed/developing dyad within the WTO.176 However, the schism here involves 
more than just the trade and macroeconomic interests of the membership; it is also a schism over 
what the purpose of the WTO itself should be. On one side are the traditionalists from developed 
countries, arguing that the WTO’s main functions should still be tariff reduction and trade 
liberalization, as they were before the Uruguay Round.177 On the other, the BRICS reformers 
who believe that poverty reduction should be the main focus of the WTO, perhaps despite the 
fact that another Bretton Woods institution, the World Bank, is already charged with this 
responsibility.178 As is discussed in the section on currency manipulation, perhaps China’s 
participation in the WTO has illuminated the ineffectiveness of the other Bretton Woods 
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institutions and thus instigated arguments that the WTO should assume the IMF’s and World 
Bank’s goals as its own.  
 The 2008 episode stands as compelling evidence towards the argument that the Doha 
Round may not have stagnated if it were not for the behind-the-scenes proactive behaviors of 
China. That said, as Cho (2010) argues, “developed countries appear to be increasingly oblivious 
to the original reasons for Doha’s creation: to foster a development round launched in response 
to…the UN Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).”179   Interview responses from one 
prominent American international trade lawyer and expert in U.S. trade policy support and 
expand upon Cho’s argument. This specialist asserted that, despite the original Round name 
including and emphasizing the word “Development,” the Round was never intended to be about 
development.180 In fact, in this lawyer’s opinion, the Round was both illegitimate and a 
misguided undertaking from the start.181 She explained that WTO members launched the Doha 
Round in November of 2001 as an “act of solidarity post 9-11” rather than as a multilateral 
initiative with pragmatic or defined goals for trade liberalization.182 Considering Doha’s true 
political underpinnings, it seems that the WTO granted Chinese accession immediately before 
Doha in order to frame the Round as a development initiative rather than to be honest about its 
actual symbolic nature. With this in mind, China could have acted in almost any other way — as 
a committed contrarian to U.S. proposals, as a U.S. supporter, or even as a developing world 
leader — and the Round still would have stagnated. This is because China, as a large and 
developing country, inevitably brings the “developed vs. developing world” showdown with it 
wherever it goes, and the Round was never, in actuality, prepared to handle the issues that arose 
as the result of this bipolar relationship.  
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As a mostly-passive member of the development and agricultural coalition, China’s 
actual actions neither illuminated legal or structural shortcomings in the WTO system, nor did it 
strengthen the WTO’s legal and diplomatic channels. Overall in the Round, China did and still 
does exhibit passivity or at least quiet strategic behavior.183 At this point China’s ability to 
maintain a spot as a top Doha negotiator without actually providing substantial support for or 
contributions to the progress of the Round suggests something new about the institutional 
prognosis of WTO-level multilateral trade negotiations.  China’s population, enormous GDP, 
and internationally consequential volume of trade flows grant it a seat at the table with the major 
WTO players.184  That said China has done little to champion proposals integral to the interests 
of the developing world, despite the vaguely supported counterarguments from Chinese 
officials.185 Of course, to suggest that China should be denied a seat at the table with other large 
countries would be a representational slight to the Chinese state and people. That said, the 
inevitable impasse that occurs from including a non-proactive member in top negotiations means 
that WTO negotiation channels will remain subpar, and regional and bilateral trade agreements 
and negotiations forums will proliferate.  
 
CHINA AND WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 
 Upon acceding to the World Trade Organization, all countries, including China and other 
non-market economies, accept the Organization’s Dispute Settlement Understanding, which was 
signed alongside the founding treaties in 1994. This text stipulates the procedural and substantive 
rules governing dispute settlement as well as the appellate process in the WTO. Initial research 
and consultation with experts suggested that China’s greatest effect, and perhaps greatest 
negative effect, on the WTO as a functional institution would appear within the context of the 
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dispute settlement mechanism.186 Of course, comprehensive answers to this question largely rely 
on information protected within client-representation relationships. This thesis provides all 
information on this topic collected during the interview process and public data and begins to 
build an analysis that, in tandem with future information made public, could develop into a 
compelling diagnosis of the DSM’s ability to handle a diverse membership.  
As introduced in the literature review, China acquiesced to a unique safeguard 
mechanism that countries could use against China as an “import-restricting policy instrument.”187 
The terms of China’s Accession Protocol also permitted (and still permit, until December 2016 at 
the earliest) countries to use NME-specific methodologies for calculating dumping margins.188 
To calculate dumping margins for countries without reliable, market-based pricing information, 
the United States, as the most prolific wielder of such AD cases against China begins by 
pinpointing an analog market economy from which comparable pricing data can be pulled. 189 
The U.S. usually picks India, as it is “at a level of economic development comparable to 
[China]” is usually also a “significant producer” of the product at question, and “Indian data for 
valuing factors of production are readily available.”190 The United States then calculates the 
normal value of the product through determining input value from factors of production and 
adding that to shipping, handling, and administrative costs.191 If the USDOC determines that 
neither India nor any other potential analog candidate comparably produces the product at 
question, the DOC is in methodological no-man’s land and must improvise in a more makeshift 
fashion than the aforementioned practices.192  
The European Union and the United States provide for Individual Treatment (IT), or 
individual examination of certain exporting companies within non-market economies.193 In both 
the E.U. and U.S. practices, only exporters can apply for these special rates.194 Just as it does for 
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non-market economy classification, the E.U. uses a positive list of company characteristics that 
permit an exporter or importer in an NME to receive market treatment, and thus individual (and 
likely lower) dumping margins.1955 As China explained in its written submission for an AD 
dispute with the E.U., if a firm qualifies for individual treatment, their dumping margins are 
calculated by directly comparing their pricing data with that of a specific, equivalent firm in the 
analogue country. If a firm fails to meet the market treatment requirements, they receive the 
general dumping margin calculated from the country wide analogue method.196  
The United States DOC criteria for a separate rate are divided into de jure requirements 
and requirements that, in practice, follow as a result of the codified requirements. The de jure 
requirements specify three aspects of the firm’s relationship to the government that emphasize 
the absence of connection, whereas the in practice requirements focus on the presence of pricing 
and corporate management factors.1976 As explained in the case description for one of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 In the resolution imposing anti-dumping duties on Chinese steel fasteners, the European Union 
details its five requirements for market economy treatment. In order, the necessary characteristics 
are: “1. business decisions and costs are made in response to market conditions and without 
significant State interference; 2. firms have one clear set of basic accounting records which are 
independently audited in line with international accounting standards and are applied for all 
purposes; 3. there are no significant distortions carried over from the former non-market 
economy system; 4. bankruptcy and property laws guarantee legal certainty and stability; and 5. 
exchange rate conversions are carried out at market rates” (http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:029:0001:0035:EN:PDF)   
 
6 From a Sidley Austin International Trade Update: “The de jure factors are: 1. An absence of 
restrictive stipulations associated with an individual exporter’s business and export licenses; 2. 
Any legislative enactments decentralizing control of companies; and 3. Any other formal 
measures by the government decentralizing control of companies. The de facto factors are: 1. 
Whether the export prices are set by, or subject to the approval of, a governmental authority; 2. 
Whether the respondent has authority to negotiate and sign contracts and other agreements; 3. 
Whether the respondent has autonomy from the central, provincial and local governments in 
making decisions regarding the selection of its management; and 4. Whether the respondent 
retains the proceeds of its export sales and makes independent decisions regarding disposition of 
profits or financing of losses.” (http://www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2015/05/20150507-
international-trade-update.pdf).  	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domestic cases revisited in US-AD/CVD (2010), the USDOC explains that it “begins with a 
rebuttable presumption that all companies within [an NME] are subject to government control 
and, thus, should be assigned a single antidumping duty deposit rate.”198 As determined in the 
USDOC original Shrimp and Sawblades case against China (revisited below), a firm qualifies as 
government controlled if it fulfills as little as one of the structural or financial criteria necessary 
to receive the country-wide NME rate.199 This again illuminates the problem with the WTO’s 
permission of a rigid market economy-NME dyad. In China and Viet Nam, this 
overgeneralization would lead to the marginalization and discrimination of market-based firms 
with just one non-market characteristic that could not thoroughly and accurately respond to 
USDOC investigational questionnaires, which could occur for a variety of reasons. Potential 
reasons include a firm’s lack of legal resources to adequately complete the questionnaires, 
communication asymmetries between USDOC and the firms, shorter timeframes imposed on 
NME-based firms “by which to complete the lengthy application necessary to demonstrate the 
absence of government control,” or the possibility that the USDOC simply did not know of the 
particular firm’s existence.200 For industries on the whole as marketized as those in market 
economies, the methodologies are both procedurally superfluous and potentially discriminatory.  
With regard to the following data, this thesis uses the terms “privatized” and 
“marketized” both interchangeably and synonymously. The author recognizes a few problems 
with this conflation but ultimately decided to retain it. There always exists the possibility that 
certain Chinese SOEs (and international SOEs, for that matter) align their prices with those of 
private national firms in a given period. In this sense, SOEs can be momentarily “marketized,” as 
they would behave according to the market forces of supply and demand, but would remain un-
privatized.201 That said, Chinese SOE pricing data does not exist in a comprehensive or reliable 
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location, as the Chinese government is notoriously opaque with regard to this information. 
Further, given the sheer number of Chinese SOEs in each industry, this data, if it were available, 
could take years to compile. Given these setbacks, privatization based on privately produced 
percentage of total output serves as the best analog method, so to speak, for determining 
marketization rates.202   
Scholarship shows that NME status correlates positively with higher-than-average 
dumping margins calculated by the U.S. Department of Commerce.203 Specifically, Blonigen 
(2003) shows that “foreign firms from non-market economies, where the USDOC uses third-
country data to estimate normal value leads to dumping margin that is 25.4% larger than 
average.”204 Chu and Prusa (2003) interpret Blonigen’s work as a positive determination that 
“even after controlling for all these unfavorable factors, China is subject to an inexplicably large 
number of anti-dumping attacks.”205 If AD cases (initiated with anomalous frequency and 
consistent use of NME methodologies) against China that make it to the WTO and target 
industries that have marketized more than the Chinese economy on the whole, then the WTO 
DSM and NME rules contribute to a dynamic in which Chinese industries are asymmetrically 
and unfairly attacked in the AD arena. The margins are not only higher than they should be in 
cases of state ownership, but also higher than they should be for the firms that are truly 
marketized but fall between the cracks.  
Review of AD cases involving China shows that the targeted Chinese industries are those 
of coated free sheet paper, iron and steel products, pneumatic tires, footwear, shrimp, and 
diamond sawblades. To be sure, the individual cases focused on these products also bring to light 
other idiosyncratic issues of NME participation. These include considerations such as 
simultaneous imposition of AD duties and CVDs, the definition of “public body” for the 
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purposes of an NME, and the practice of zeroing, both in general and with regarding to state-
owned enterprises.206 There is also a recent case in which China complained about NME AD 
methodologies directly.  
The following table provides the dumping margins and methodological specifics used by 
the United States and the European Union in the aforementioned AD cases involving China. 
CVD calculations in the cases (or cases involving only CVDs) are omitted. Next shown are the 
marketization rates for targeted industries. Shrimp is omitted for reasons explained below.7 
AD WTO CASES: CHINA AS COMPLAINANT  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Chinese aquaculture and fishing firms often catch and sell both fish and prawns (including but 
not limited to shrimp), alongside myriad other aquaculture products. It is possible to conduct a 
marketization analysis for the whole fishing industry at large and it is possible to find total output 
values for the total shrimp industry specifically. It is not possible to find the output value of 
SOE-produced shrimp specifically as the SOEs do not publish the percentage of their total output 
devoted to prawn production. SOE outputs are divided into fish and aquaculture outputs, whereas 
POE outputs are divided by species. In other words, the categories for SOE and POE do not 
match up and therefore marketization analysis using the below method would be meaningless 
and probably inaccurate. Further, this thesis only considers centrally owned SOEs (in all 
examined countries and industries), and much of the shrimp production occurs at the provincial 
and local levels.  
Case Dumping Margins Imposed 
Before WTO Case 
Methodological Information for Dumping 
Duty Calculation and Imposition  
 
European 
Communities – 
Definitive Anti-
Dumping Measures 
on Certain Iron or 
Steel Fasteners 
from China (2009) 
• Individual Treatment 
Average Margin: 
56.73%207  
 
• General NME Margin: 
115.4%208  
• Use of India as an analog209  
• Only 10 Chinese exporting companies 
willingly provided credible pricing 
information to the EC, and 9 of these 
10 fit the IT qualifications and were 
chosen to support the individual 
treatment calculation.210  
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US- Definitive Anti 
Dumping and 
Countervailing 
Duties on Certain 
Products from 
China (2009-2011) 
(Dumping Only) 
Circular Welded Carbon Quality 
Steel Pipe (CWP):  
• General NME rate: 
85.55% 
• Uniform Separate Rate: 
69.2% 211 
Pneumatic Off-the-Road Tires:  
• General NME rate: 
210.48% 
• Uniform Separate Rate: 
5.25%212 
Light-Walled Rectangular Pipe 
and Tube (LWR): 
• General NME rate: 
264.64% 
• Uniform Separate Rate: 
249.12%213 
Laminated Woven Sacks (LWS):  
• General NME rate: 
91.73% 
• Uniform Separate Rate: 
64.26%214 
• CWP: Use of India as an analog.215 
• Pneumatic Tires: use of Maersk 
conglomerate prices and Indian 
companies for surrogate pricing. 216 
Interestingly, these surrogate choices 
were retained despite the inclusion in 
this case of dumping complaints 
against Indian companies.217  
• LWR: Use of India as analog.218 
 
United States – 
Anti Dumping 
Measures on 
Shrimp and 
Diamond 
Sawblades from 
China (2011)  
Shrimp:  
• Individual Respondent 
Margins (Average): 
48.79%219  
• Uniform Separate Rate 
Margin: 55.68%220 
• General NME Margin: 
112.81%221  
 
Sawblades:  
• Individual Respondent 
Margins (Average): 
28.94%222  
• Uniform Separate Rate 
Margin: 21.43%223 
• General NME Margin: 
164.09%224 
• Shrimp: The USDOC used zeroing to 
calculate the margins for the “separate 
rate” firms.225  
• Sawblades:  Use of India as an 
analog.226 
US- Preliminary 
Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing 
Duty 
Determinations on 
 
• Average Separate Rate 
Margin: 33.83%227 
 
 
• Use of India as an analog.229 
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MARKETIZATION/PRIVATIZATION IN CHINA: (2011)2328:  
Industry Total Output from 
State-Owned or State-
Held Enterprises 
Total Output of 
Privately-Owned 
Enterprises 
Total 
Output of 
Industry 
(SOE + 
POE) 
Marketization/ 
Privatization 
Level for 
Industry 
Manufacture of 
Rubber Products9  
Number of SOEs: 100 
Gross Output Value: 
889.96 
 
Number of POEs: 1847 
Gross Output Value:  
2701.66 
Output: 
3591.62 
75.22% of output  
Manufacture of 
Metal Products10  
Number of SOEs: 381 
Gross Output Value: 
1346.28 
 
Number of POEs: 9982 
Gross Output Value: 
11590.82 
Output: 
12937.10 
89.59% of output  
Smelting and Number of SOEs: 312 Number of POEs: 4246 Output: 41.05% of output  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Statistics come from the China Statistical Yearbook of 2012. Output percentages for 
aquaculture come from a publication cited in note 12. All data comes from the year 2011 as by 
that time all cases considered in the above AD margin chart had been initiated by then. Gross 
Output Value is measured in 100 million Yuan.  
9 The author assumes that pneumatic tires fall within the rubber and plastics manufacturing 
category.  
10 The author assumes that diamond sawblades and LWR fall within the metal products category.  
Coated Free Sheet 
Paper from China 
(2007) 
• General NME Margin: 
99.65%228 
EC- Anti-Dumping 
Measures on 
Certain Footwear 
From China  
China 
• Market Economy 
Treatment Rate: 5%-16%  
• NME Rate Using 
Indonesia: 19%-22%  
• NME Rate Using Brazil: 
35%-38%  
 
Viet Nam  
• Market Economy 
Treatment Rate: none 
granted  
• NME Rate Using 
Indonesia: 28.4% 
• NME Rate Using Brazil: 
43.8%230  
 
• This case also involved imports from 
Viet Nam.  
• Use of Brazil as analog due to a 
sizeable product market in Brazil. The 
EC notes, though, the faultiness of this 
analog decision, as Brazil, China, and 
Viet Nam do not show similar levels 
of economic development. Given the 
analog choice problems, margins were 
also calculated using Indonesia as an 
analog for a second opinion, so to 
speak.231 
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Pressing of 
Ferrous Metals11  
Gross Output Value: 
23652.24 
 
Gross Output Value: 
16469.26 
40121.50 
Paper and Paper 
Products  
 
Number of SOEs: 127 
Gross Output Value: 
838.64 
Number of POEs: 4182 
Gross Output Value: 
4604.78 
Output: 
5443.42 
84.59% of output  
Manufacture of 
Textile (non-
wearable and 
non-carpet)12 
 
Number of SOEs: 275 
Gross Output Value: 
769.96 
 
Number of POEs: 14883 
Gross Output Value: 
16464.33 
 
Output: 
17234.29 
95.53% of output 
Manufacture of 
Textile Wearing 
Apparel, 
Footwear and 
Caps  
  
Number of SOEs: 124 
Gross Output Value: 
183.59 
 
Number of POEs: 6060 
Gross Output Value: 
6039.93 
 
Output: 
6223.52 
97.05% of output 
 
Before presenting the Indian data, it should be noted that only 225 centrally owned SOEs 
were operating in India by the end of 2011.233 Due to this fact, statistics regarding the number of 
SOEs per industry are omitted, and only output value statistics (revenue) are shown. The list of 
CPSEs is taken from the Indian Department of Commerce website.234  
MARKETIZATION/PRIVATIZATION IN INDIA (2011)13 
Industry Total Output from State-
Owned or State-Held 
Enterprises 
Total Output of 
Industry (SOE + 
POE) 
Marketization/ 
Privatization Level for 
Industry 
Manufacture and Reparation 
of Rubber Tires and Tubes14  
Gross Output Value: 
27.04 (one firm, Tyre 
Output: 48,205 99.94% of output 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 The author assumes that all iron and steel products discussed in this thesis fall within this 
category.	  	  
12 The author assumes that Laminated Woven Sacks fall within this category of textile 
production.  13	  Data comes from 2011 or the closest available year (marked when applicable). However, it is 
assumed that while new private firms may have been established in India between 2011 and 
2016, the number of SOEs remained relatively static, as India is not undergoing marketization 
process like China. SOE data are collected from various sources, as cited in the notes, and total 
industry output values collected from the India Statistical Yearbook, 2015. Output Values are in 
10 million Rupees. 	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Corporation of India 
Ltd.)235  
Manufacture of Cutlery, 
Tools, and General 
Hardware15  
N/A 
 
Output: 11,327  Virtual full 
marketization 
Manufacture of Iron and 
Steel16 
Gross Output Value: 
58,136 
Three Firms: 
• Mishra Dhatu 
Nigam 
(518.5442)236 
• Steel Authority of 
India 
(42,718.71)237 
• Rashtriya Ispat 
Nigam Ltd 
14,899238 
 
Output: 607,846  90.44% of output 
Paper and Paper Products  Gross Output Value: 
7,002.8239 (one firm, 
Hindustan Paper)  
Output: 67,589  89.64% of output  
Manufacture of Textile 
(non-wearable and non-
carpet)17 
Gross Output Value: 
448.26 (National Textile 
Corporation)240 
Output: 302,500 99.83% of output  
 
MARKETIZATION/PRIVATIZATION IN BRAZIL AND INDONESIA (2011)18  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Used as a sub-industry of the rubber industry to provide a more accurate categorization for 
pneumatic tires.	  
15 More specific Indian industry used as a benchmark for the diamond sawblade industry.  
16 Closest analog industry category to Chinese “Smelting and Pressing of Ferrous Metals.” LWR 
included, conceptually speaking, for Indian data in this category.  17	  State-owned textile production in India originates with the National Textile Corporation 
(NTC). The NTC was lossmaking and considered a sick SOE until late 2014. The output value 
provided represents sales of yarn and cloth products in 2011-2012. This company makes almost 
entirely non-apparel textiles (Personal correspondence, Prof. Devesh Kapur, Director, Center for 
Advanced Study of India University of Pennsylvania, March 23, 2016).  
18 Indonesian output value in billion U.S. dollars and Brazilian output in 1000 Brazilian Reals.  
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Manufacture of 
Footwear and 
Apparel in 
Brazil241  
N/A  
 
N/A 
 
Output: 
7,356,925 
 
Virtual full 
marketization19 
Manufacture of 
Footwear in 
Indonesia242  
N/A 
 
N/A Output: 
50,096 
	  50	  096	  
 
Virtual full 
marketization 
 
The author considered certain Indian industries to be operating at virtual full 
marketization levels if, after scrutiny of India’s 225 active central SOEs, it was not apparent that 
any SOE produced the product in question. Though the industries may include provincial SOEs, 
this thesis does not consider those and instead conceptualizes provincialization as akin to 
decentralization and thus as evidence of a trend towards privatization and marketization. To be 
sure, Indian SOEs are notoriously conglomeratic, and the production of obscure products, such 
as certain laminated woven sacks, could be buried within their production data. The author 
recognizes this fact, but after surveying a variety of publications detailing the activities of certain 
candidate Indian SOEs, arrived at the conclusions that a) either the production of these obscure 
goods was not present or b) it was inconsequential with regard to the SOE’s output and the 
relevant industry share as a whole. Last, to analyze this data, this thesis defines a “marketized 
and privatized” industry as one operating at an 89% marketization level or above. The author 
chose this level, as it is the marketization level to the closest integer, rounded-down, for the least 
marketized Indian industry in the data, and India is considered a full market economy.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Despite the fact that the Brazilian government does not operate recognizable or substantial (if 
any) footwear production enterprises, in terms of government procurement, the Brazilian 
government does, arguably, provide disproportionate preference to its footwear and apparel 
companies vis-à-vis foreign providers. For more information see: Bureau of Economic and 
Business Affairs, “2015 Investment Climate Statement – Brazil,” (Washington, DC: United 
States Department of State, 2015), http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2015/241494.htm.	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Based on the above data, the Chinese textile and metal products industries constitute 
privatized and marketized industries. Though it fails to meet the benchmark established in this 
thesis, the Chinese paper products industry also comes close to qualifying as a marketized 
industry. According to this data, the greatest possibility for NME status-based discrimination, 
rooted in the technical, legal, and administrative reasons listed above, has existed within these 
industries. The Chinese rubber firms unable to prove autonomy seem to deserve the NME rate. 
That said, the analog Indian industry used includes the reparation of tires; the categories are not 
entirely equivalent, and it may be that Chinese reparation services are housed in separate and 
possibly, on average, more privatized firms than tire manufacturing.  
The data above supports the comments from various interviewees that steel industries 
stand to lose the most from a change in the status for the Chinese economy.243 The privatization 
discrepancy in steel between China, India, and other WTO members is vast; thus the steel 
industry’s push to maintain NME status despite China’s general marketization makes sense. 
However, the above data suggests that the push to conserve NME status is an anchor, dug into 
the groundwork of steel interests, dragging the other Chinese industries underwater. That NME 
status seems to align most effectively and ethically with steel suggests that for other Chinese 
industries and perhaps many individual firms, NME status is nothing but a political roadblock 
keeping them from recognizing the full benefit of an earned WTO membership.  
 
EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS 
Interviewees tended to provide “yes-or-no” answers, often with explanation added later in 
the interview, to the questions involving the degradation of evidentiary standards. To clarify, this 
question goes beyond asking whether or not NME methodologies as a whole system ignore the 
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increasing marketization of targeted Chinese industries. Instead, it asks whether or not invoking 
NME methodology sends a signal to a WTO Panel that the Panel need not require as much 
economic evidence, analog or not, to assess a case. Of the 12 interviewees, three answered “no” 
to question 7, three answered yes or yes to some extent, two provided unique, potentially neutral 
answers, and four did not comment or felt as though the question could not be answered. Three 
of the eight responders offered extended answers, detailed below:  
 
“FUNGIBILITY OF NATIONS” (YES) 
 The interviewee possessing the highest level of familiarity with China’s accession 
process argued that these “rules apply a fungibility of nations.”244 Though this subject did not 
elaborate much, Ji Ma’s work on the analog method both supports and expands this analysis. As 
Ji Ma notes, “the most often chosen analogue country [in trade remedies cases in general, not just 
in the DSM] to China by the U.S. is India, while for the E.U. it is [the] USA.”245 As shown in the 
Footwear case, members sometimes use Indonesia and Brazil as well. It seems that the vague 
guidelines, as stipulated individually by WTO members and sanctioned by the WTO, allow, in 
practice, for members to choose analog countries based on one metric such as comparable 
production of the good in question and/or level of economic development. Perhaps a test using 
just these two components can at times draw meaningful comparisons between China and India, 
China and the U.S., China and Brazil, or China and Indonesia. However, the facts-on-the-ground 
show that the analog method allows for an interchangeability of countries even when the 
production or development data does not match up as best as it could.  
 Of Chinese industries that find categorically equivalent analogs in the Indian data, each 
is substantially larger than its Indian counterpart.246 While the data above provides rough 
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estimations for the relative size of Chinese and Indian industries, to accurately compare industry 
size, one must look at crude production rather than at income. Comparative factors of consumer 
preference, nuanced quality of goods, or the conglomeratic and multi-product nature of certain 
companies could make prices, and thus total income/output, a faulty measure of relative industry 
size. Further, the categories presented in the marketization data may not match up perfectly 
across countries; for example, the Indian hardware and tools industry is smaller, obviously, than 
the more general Chinese “metal products” industry. To remain as accurate and politically 
relevant as possible, one can consider the steel industry a case in point here. The Chinese steel 
industry was 9.59 times larger than the Indian steel industry in terms of crude production in 
2011, and the closest comparable producer to China was Japan.247 That said the Japanese enjoy 
an astronomically higher level of macroeconomic wellbeing than the Chinese do. For a factor 
test as rudimentary as that involved in the analog method, the best analog for the Chinese steel 
industry exists somewhere between the Indian and Japanese markets and thus, of course, a 
suitable analog does not actually exist. This specialist’s comment and the simple example of 
Chinese steel show that the analog method allows WTO members to assess the Chinese economy 
through rudimentary and inappropriately isolated factors. As a socialist market economy, a 
developing nation, and a manufacturing hegemon, China is idiosyncratic and un-replicable by the 
models and methods of AD calculation.  
 
AD/CVD IN GENERAL (NO) 
One international trade lawyer pushed back against the idea that NME methods in 
particular caused an erosion of evidentiary standards in the DSM. Instead, he argues that the way 
in which the WTO Panels assess AD and CVD cases in general bring a degraded sense of 
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evidence to the multilateral trading system.248 First, this interviewee distinguished between “as 
such” claims (challenge of a provision, method, or trade regulation as a whole) and “as applied” 
cases (challenge of how a provision, method, or regulation was used in a particular moment). He 
mentioned that, overall, more “as such” claims than “as applied” claims have been made by 
China in WTO dispute settlement. He argued that “as such” claims impact the DSM structure 
and functionality more than “as applied” do in that the espousing cases for “as such” claims 
require less factual evidence to be presented and grant greater room for the dispute parties to 
offer divergent, multifaceted, and far-reaching interpretations.249 China’s participation may have 
degraded the evidentiary standards of the DSM, but this was not due to any unique economic or 
political characteristic of China itself. Rather, China has often challenged U.S. provisions as 
whole statutes, thus facilitated the emergence of a dispute settlement system that relies on less 
evidence more frequently to establish Panel decisions.  
 
THE RULES ARE AIRTIGHT (NO) 
A few interviewees seemed astonished at the idea that NME methods cause structural 
problems related to evidence presentation. These subjects added that the DSM system for trade 
remedies, in general, is as structurally sound as it could be. The interviewees who maintained 
this position have worked within the WTO system itself as panel members or Secretariat counsel.  
 
Interview subjects remain entirely anonymous, even when assessing the underlying 
motivations behind a “yes” vs. “no” answer. What can be said, though, is that those with more 
expertise in the WTO system tended to reject the notion of degraded evidentiary standards, 
whereas those with more expertise in Chinese trade and legal practices tended to consider it 
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plausible. All of this considered, the trend remained clear that if standards were degraded, it was 
less because of particular challenges brought by China and more because of the potential for 
inconsistencies in interpretation and application of NME rules as written and used by market 
economies.  
 
Interviewees pinpointed the 2014 CVD case brought by China against the U.S. (case D in 
the method section) as an instance metonymical of China’s participation in the DSM. To 
reiterate, this case involved deeper interpretation of the term “public body” for the purposes of 
determining the existence of prohibited subsidization. It was initiated a few years after DS379, 
which was the first instance of China challenging a U.S. understanding of “public bodies.” 
Evidently, this claim constitutes an “as such” claim rather than an “as applied” claim. In DS379, 
“the [AB] reversed the Panel’s finding that the term ‘public body’ in…the SCM Agreement 
means ‘any entity controlled by the government.”250 Instead, the AB asserted that a public body 
is, at its “core,” that “possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority””251 In the 
2014 case, China disagreed with the USDOC’s revised criterion that a “public body” be more 
than 50% government owned.252 One D.C.-area international trade lawyer recalled the 2014 case 
and explained that the “conflicting economic systems” of the parties “underlay the different 
interpretations of public body,” or in other words, economic structure of the arguing members 
affected each member’s respective definition of “public body.”253 This insight is consistent with 
the capitalist nature and trade-related interests of the United States, as well as the trade interests 
of China and the hybrid, ambiguous nature of Chinese SOEs. However, comments from the 
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third-parties’ submissions, listed below, in the 2014 public body case offer another layer to this 
comment with regard to their respective market/NME treatment of China itself:20  
 
Party (status given to China) Comments 
Australia (NME) Australia disagrees that a firm must be “vested with government authority” to be a 
public body and argues that a firm can have government authority, and thus be a 
public body, without being “vested with it.”  
Brazil (MES) Government ownership alone does not unequivocally mean that a firm is a public 
body according to the previous WTO definitions.  
Canada (NME) Canada maintains support for the original definition in DS379, that a firm is a public 
body if simply “controlled by the government.” 
European Union (NME) 1. EU argues that China’s rhetoric and word choice in submissions in general 
are repeatedly ambiguous and hard to interpret.  
2. The EU also comments that when the USDOC defines a public body to 
exhibit “the possibility of [government] control through whatever means…is 
too broad,” as every firm in a given country is subject to taxes and 
government regulations and thus is subject to indirect control.   
Norway (NME) Norway notes that the WTO DSM aims to “ensure ‘security and predictability” in 
the dispute settlement system, and thus earlier public body definitions should be 
upheld. Thus, Norway, like Canada, supports the first definition. That said, it also 
emphasizes, that despite government control being the fundamental criterion for a 
public body, the terms “government” and “public body” are neither rhetorically 
synonymous nor conceptually equivalent.  
Saudi Arabia (NME) Saudi Arabia did not support, in terms of value, any of the previous interpretations 
or arguments involving the definition of a public body. That said, Saudi Arabia did 
emphasize the AB argument in DS379 that “a public body must possess the ability 
to compel, command, control or govern a private body. Government ownership or 
control of an entity is not sufficient to establish that the entity exercises 
governmental authority, and no other factor is dispositive.” 
 
The European Union comment arguing for a narrower and more stringent definition of 
public body seems like related to the level of difficulty with which a firm could be designated an 
NME and more related to a genuine political-economic clarification. In stating that taxation and 
regulation of firms does not constitute “public body” level control, the E.U. improves the “public 
body” definition objectively and universally, as all countries tax and regulate their corporations. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 All chart data taken from The World Trade Organization, United States – Countervailing Duty 
Measures on Certain Products from China: Report of the Panel (Addendum), WT/DS437/R.  
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Aside from the EU comment, the interpretive divide on this issue falls along the lines of the 
developed-developing nation binary, and by default also falls along the granted MES status vs. 
retained NME status dyad. The Canadian and Norwegian submissions retain the original, 
simplistic definition of “public body” and thus retain the simplicity and ease with which a 
member state could designate a Chinese firm as a public body. Similarly, the Australian 
submission removes a criterion (“vested” with government authority”) from the proverbial 
“public body” checklist, thus also easing the process of pinpointing a Chinese public body and 
protecting against its subsidization.  
Brazil’s interpretive notes stand in stark contrast to those of the developed nations 
mentioned above. Brazil is a member of the BRICS developing countries along with China and 
already grants China nominal market-economy status. Further, Brazil (along with India) led the 
developing nation contingent against U.S. and E.U. agricultural subsidies in the early Doha 
Round, whereas China opted to stay passive and relatively quiet on this issue.254 Brazil argues 
that assigning a firm the “public body” definition requires more than a simple determination of 
government control. In making it more difficult to label a Chinese firm a “public body,” Brazil 
provides implicit support to Chinese firms, obstructing U.S. or E.U. ability to a) designate a 
subsidy as prohibited or b) use NME methods (and thus wield higher antidumping duties) against 
these firms. Saudi Arabia seems slightly more passive and ambivalent than Brazil, but 
nonetheless is attempts to further convolute the definition of “public body.” Though Saudi 
Arabia still designated China as an NME, this oil exporter maintains close trade and investment 
ties with China and, like China, relies on nationalized entities (specifically, its one massive oil 
company, Saudi Aramco) for economic development.255 Saudi Arabia’s rhetorical and analytical 
decisions are indicative of its desires to protect its economic relationship with China as well as to 
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maintain government support and preferential treatment for Aramco. Especially now, as Saudi 
Arabia debates offering ownership of certain Aramco assets to Saudi and international 
stockholders, a protective definition of “public body” could prevent this an Aramco initial public 
offering (IPO) from jeopardizing the state’s ability to intervene with the company.256 Thus the 
language of Saudi Arabia’s claim in 2014 suggests its desire to make it more difficult for WTO 
members to target subsidization of Aramco in the future.  
These interpretive divides on the issues of public bodies, government functions, and the 
appropriate scope of government between the “market” economies perhaps would not exist in the 
WTO context if the NMEs were not members. Further, whereas space for divergent 
interpretations may exist within the SCM Agreement provisions regarding public bodies and 
government control, this ambiguity would not have been brought to light if not for the NMEs, 
whose economies are affected differently by each new, potential interpretive outcome regarding 
these provisions.  In other words, the WTO legal language on public bodies was already unclear, 
but China’s participation prompted the discussion about this lack of clarity.  
As noted in the 2014 case, both the United States and China agree that “in United States – 
Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China, [the AB] 
emphasized the case-by-case nature of the distortion inquiry.”257 In other words, no precedential 
method can be set to determine whether subsidization is causing market distortion basis, nor can 
one be set for the process of selecting surrogate country pricing information for subsidies cases. 
The legal volatility surrounding the use of surrogate pricing methods subverts the ability of WTO 
law, at least with regard to AD/CVD, to become constitutionalized. Precedent is meaningless if 
each NME subsidies case is unique by definition. NME participation, and specifically that of 
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China, has therefore undermined the constitutionalization process that Deborah Cass explains in 
her scholarly forecasts of China in the WTO.   
 
CHINA AND WTO LEGAL CULTURE, SCOPE, AND INSTITUTIONAL PURPOSE 
1. EDUCATIONAL INITIATIVES AND A TOP-DOWN APPROACH TO ACCESSION:   
Most interviewees who offered opinions of China’s view of the WTO emphasized that China 
itself “instigated the accession process” as it “really wanted to join the WTO.”258 Scholarship 
generally responds to this phenomenon by considering that China wanted (and even needed) the 
WTO to realize its intentions of export-oriented economic growth. However, one interviewee 
offered a less discussed and arguably more interesting interpretation of the Chinese 
government’s enthusiasm towards WTO membership. This specialist considered that China, 
from the get-go, intended to use WTO membership to “legitimize the political power, authority, 
and capability of the Communist Party.”259 This interviewee confirmed the author of this thesis’ 
hypothesis that, in order to legitimate the Communist Party and validate the push for WTO 
accession, the Chinese Government initiated an unprecedented and bizarrely thorough campaign 
to education the Chinese populace, especially businesspeople, about trade policy and WTO 
institutions.260 
 This seems counter-intuitive given the historical political-economic interests of Communist 
parties. In The Politics of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization, Feng (2006) 
reviews scholarship supporting the position that, with regard to trade liberalization, communist 
parties historically “block the external message of opportunity to domestic groups who would 
benefit the most.”261 Generally, international trade politics are centered upon the idea that 
business executives benefit most from market expansion whereas low-skilled workers lose jobs 
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and wages to foreign competition. Business leaders do not run the risk of losing their jobs and 
should thus be excited by the prospect of a larger consumer base created through reduction of 
trade barriers. In the unique case of pre-accession China, opposition “to the …bid for WTO 
membership” came from domestic industry and was championed by the “central decision-
making body” in China (the Communist Party elite).262. The push to join the international 
economic community, then, involved the non-standard struggle of the Party elite to convince 
business leaders that WTO membership was worthwhile.  
To sell the Chinese business community (and individual people as well) on accession to the 
WTO, the Communist Party waged an extensive educational campaign to increase public 
knowledge of WTO functions, institutions, and the implications of membership.263 While many 
member countries have Offices for WTO Affairs within their national commerce or trade 
agencies, China’s internal institutionalization of WTO educational resources, state-to-WTO 
interactions, and research initiatives to improve WTO strategy was and still is unique. At least 
three Chinese universities have offered graduate degrees in WTO law since 2002, and Wuhan 
University’s WTO Studies School, the earliest of such programs, began in 1999.264 In addition, 
China allowed foreign governments and international organizations to conduct WTO educational 
courses in China for CCP officials and businesspeople alike.265 The Chinese government itself 
sponsored academic competitions for ordinary citizens to show off their WTO-specific 
knowledge.266 Further, the Chinese government established and continues to finance a WTO 
Accessions Internship Program for young professionals from developing countries to bolster 
national “brain banks” of WTO knowledge.267   
From the perspective of Chinese citizens and businesspeople, the educational campaigns and 
domestic institutional development form a political strategy to bolster trust in the CCP as a 
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provider of accurate and global information. The Chinese government emphasized the 
importance of understanding the WTO from the inside out in order to effectively and 
sophisticatedly perform within the WTO system. Even if Chinese citizens held biased views of 
WTO membership’s normative and economic implications for the Chinese people, information 
about the technical and legal apparatuses of the WTO system in and of themselves was presented 
to the populace thoroughly, academically, and truthfully. China created its internship program 
within the WTO itself and allows professionals from other developing countries to join as well. 
This signals to the WTO membership that China is enthusiastic about integrating into the WTO 
in good faith and as a sophisticated player. Further, the internationalization of China’s internship, 
as well as the allowance of foreign influences to provide WTO educational services send an 
important signal to the Chinese populace and business community. China’s behaviors signal its 
commitment to providing internationally verified, and thus arguably truthful, information about 
the WTO to its people. The CCP certainly does not ensure this level of accuracy or thoroughness 
in all (or most) cases when presenting information to the citizenry. Arguably, the decision to 
provide the populace with factual WTO information is both a genuine initiative as well as a 
political move. On one hand, it ensures that the performance of China, as a monolithic entity, 
will be based on thorough understanding of WTO rules and norms. Thus China will succeed in 
the procedural sense, which could lead to China’s success in the substantive sense. However, to 
say that this would help China realize its economic and diplomatic interests assumes that China, 
as a state member to an international organization, is a monolithic entity whose interests are 
espoused by the CCP position.  
Following this logic, one can see how the CCP’s choice to isolate WTO knowledge as one 
topic on which to provide the populace with correct and thorough information is strategic. The 
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move buys the CCP future political capital. It allows the CCP to refer back to WTO educational 
initiatives as an example that supports its image as a functional, globally connected, and 
accommodating regime. Even more broadly, in choosing international relations as the arena in 
which to be honest with its citizens, the CCP increases its chances that the Chinese people will 
feel comfortable with the CCP negotiating with foreign countries on their behalf. The Chinese 
people have little control over their government’s policies, but citizens may remain complacent if 
they feel economically and internationally secure. Increasing the odds that they feel this way, by 
giving them a hand in the development of WTO policy, in turn secures the control and perceived 
legitimacy of the CCP.  
 
2. CURRENCY MANIPULATION AND WTO LEGAL BANDWIDTH21  
Accusations from the international community that China manipulates its currency to gain 
unfair trading advantages serve to paint China as a nefarious trading partner. Currency 
manipulation refers to actions taken by a government, often times in a developing country, to 
devalue its currency relative to the currency of a trading partner, usually in a developed nation. 
This artificially makes the exports from the manipulating country cheaper in the global market 
while raising prices on imports.268 From the U.S. perspective, if a country devalues its currency 
relative to the dollar, exporting to that country becomes more expensive, meaning it is more 
expensive to maintain export-oriented jobs like manufacturing positions in the U.S. 269 
Manipulative actions include selling excessive amounts of the native currency and buying 
excessive reserves (bonds and other financial assets) in foreign currencies.270 To give a country 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Parts of this subsection appear in a paper on the Trans-Pacific Partnership written by the 
author of this thesis in April 2015. Though this work is not published verbatim or in a long form 
piece, a condensed and rephrased version of this work is published in the Penn Journal of 
Economics.  
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case example, Bergsten and Gagnon (2012) at the Peterson Institute for International Economics 
note that recent currency manipulation from 20 countries has cost the United States between 1 
and 5 million jobs and while increasing the U.S. trade deficit by between $200 and $500 
billion.271 
 Establishing practical and enforceable currency manipulation controls against China may 
be impossible because “proving the existence and extent of currency misalignment…has proven 
enormously difficult.”272 In other words, it is difficult to distinguish between deliberate currency 
manipulation and indirect fluctuation resulting from legitimate domestic policy decisions.273 The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) articles and the World Trade Organization charter both 
attempt to define and prohibit currency manipulation.274 However, respective restrictions on 
“chang[ing]…the par value of…currency except to correct [for] fundamental disequilibrium” and 
providing a “subsidy to exports” have not prevented Chinese (and others’) currency interventions 
that negatively affect the U.S. economy.275 The IMF prohibits manipulations that do not address 
a “fundamental disequilibrium” in exchange rates. However, determining whether or not a 
currency intervention policy corrects “disequilibrium” is difficult due to the inability of 
economists to “pin down the equilibrium [exchange] rate”.276 Economists do not agree on which 
of the multiple economic models available to measure currency manipulation and misalignment 
is most effective. Therefore, economists cannot accurately determine the extent to which China 
manipulates its currency. Estimates vary from a 49% undervaluation to a 100% overvaluation of 
the RMB.277   
 Though neither the WTO nor the IMF offers comprehensive enough descriptions of and 
protections against currency manipulation, the IMF definition and existent surveillance 
capabilities are certainly more sophisticated than the analogous provisions available in WTO 
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treaties. Article IV of the IMF Agreement establishes that “avoid[ing] manipulating exchange 
rates or the international monetary system in order to prevent effective balance of payments 
adjustment or to gain unfair competitive advantage over other members” as a “general 
obligation” of IMF members.278 This seems like an explanation for currency manipulation, and 
of course, the IMF is an organization devoted to the regulation and oversight of international 
monetary policies whereas the WTO is an organization established to lower international barriers 
to trade. Given these descriptions, one would expect the IMF to take the reigns on issues 
regarding currency manipulation, as this topic seems to exist outside of the WTO purview. 
However, as trade becomes increasingly liberalized, currency manipulation becomes more and 
more of a trade-related concern. The IMF general obligations section asserts that currency 
manipulation is a direct cause of “unfair competitive advantage,” thus pinpointing currency 
manipulation as a trade issue, and the introductory IMF Articles direct the IMF to “facilitate the 
expansion and balances growth of international trade.”279 That said, scholarship shows that the 
IMF practical capacity to enforce its rules, usually through making loans to countries conditional 
upon compliance with IMF rules, lags behind the practical enforcement capacity behind the 
WTO DSM rulings and negotiated agreements. Chorev and Babb (2008) explain that the IMF 
cannot demand compliance and maintain the conditionality of its loans when a) countries have 
access to significant amounts of private capital and b) when the IMF “engages in ‘defensive 
lending.’” Essentially, once the IMF has provided capital to a country, it becomes invested in 
ensuring the success of the country “to preserve its own international image.” Thus, the IMF is 
unlikely to follow through on conditionality threats and might even “provide new loans so that 
the government can pay off old ones” to keep up the perceptive that the IMF is effective.280  
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 On the other hand, the WTO’s effectiveness does not rely on an external factor (private 
capital), nor does it rely on how the WTO manages some internal resource (i.e: loans within the 
IMF). Rather, WTO membership and compliance with the rules provide countries with a 
privilege that they already have the capacity to facilitate all on their own: the reduction of 
technical and domestically codified trade barriers.281 Unlike the IMF, it is advantageous for a 
country to adhere to the WTO regardless of its economic performance because all countries want 
to realize gains from trade, and “all successful nations are trading nations” in the globalized 
economy.282 Further, it would always be disadvantageous for existing members leave the WTO 
because then WTO members could discriminate against them in trade. The stakes of WTO entry 
or WTO exit do not change with the availability of a resource left uncontrollable by the WTO. 
The WTO is considerably more removed than the IMF from the problem of “resource 
leveraging” and seems more structurally resilient, sound, and stable. This assessment and its 
potentially implementable implications become important especially as China becomes a more 
active and consequential player in international trade. China, often criticized as the world’s worst 
currency manipulator, has exposed the shortcomings of the WTO legal system in handling 
currency manipulation-related issues.  However, this shortcoming is avoidable, given the rigidity 
of the MFN principle and the WTO’s function as a moderator, but not controller, of resources in 
international trade.  
 
3. WTO MEMBERSHIP AND POLITICAL-ECONOMIC “CONVERGENCE”:  
The method of expert testimony collection and synthesis used in this project allows for a 
nuanced rhetorical analysis of the language used by specialists in the field to discuss China as a 
player in the multilateral trading system. One interviewee with the greatest amount of China-
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specific trade law knowledge repeatedly referred to December 2016 as the moment of China’s 
potential “graduation” to market-economy status.283 This offers some initial insight into how 
certain international trade lawyers understand Chinese transition to MES as a progressive rite-of-
passage, or a development indicative of China’s political-economic maturation. Teleological 
language of “graduation” implicitly characterizes the WTO as a capitalism-advocating and 
ideologically unwavering organization. In a word, the WTO’s vision of ideal political economy 
is ideal and countries become true members of the international economic community when they 
embody said ideals. This may in fact be the view underlying usage of the term “graduation.” This 
language implies a subjective and moral preference towards capitalist orientation, but whether 
capitalism is moralized here or not, scholars from other countries engaged in trade with China 
still emphasize that China joined the WTO “in order to transform itself into a market 
economy.”284 However, some Chinese scholars believe that China never intended to “graduate” 
within the WTO system in the first place. Hsieh (2010) argues that China’s constitutionalized 
call for “socialism with Chinese characteristics” as the country progressed with economic reform 
and opening implies that China intended to use WTO membership to “participate in global trade 
to strengthen Chinese socialism rather than succumb to Western ideology.”285  
The last interview subject (an American lawyer) emphasized that China’s accession to the 
WTO and subsequent implementation of internal economic and organizational reforms stipulated 
within the Protocol represented a process of “convergence” necessary to join the WTO.286 In 
fact, this subject argued that the point of the WTO system was to “force convergence.”287 This 
suggests that the WTO system was never meant to welcome or even accommodate political-
economic diversity among its members, and thus in joining the WTO, China should have (and 
indeed may have) recognized its imminent development into a capitalist economy. In the same 
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interview, though, this subject adamantly insisted that the WTO “does not penalize countries for 
different political economic structures.”288 She backs up this claim by noting that the WTO 
“creates a set of uniform rules” to govern use of dispute settlement, facilitate negotiations for 
trade liberalization, ensure a “predictable” international trade arena, and protect countries from 
the discriminatory trading practices of others.289According to this interviewee, the system does 
not allow for non-market economies to bear disproportionate burdens. Her view suggests that the 
Safeguard and NME methodologies are corrective methods that have, both in practice and 
conceptually, brought NMEs in line with the rest of the pack. This would make sense if the most 
important bearer of these policies, China, was still unequivocally and wholly an NME. As this 
thesis shows in its literature review, now it is not and, at least as long as it has been a member in 
the WTO, perhaps never was. The problem then is not that the WTO-plus rules are inherently 
discriminatory but that the discrepancy between their intended target and the political-economic 
facts-on-the-ground in China create a space in which China receives inappropriate treatment. 
 
SECTION VIII: CONCLUDING THOUGHTS 
Cass, Jackson, Bown, and others believed that China’s participation in the WTO would 
forever alter the organization’s institutions and norms and that such alteration would be negative. 
They projected that China’s participation as a large and powerful developing country, as a non-
market economy, and as a country lacking economic and political transparency would contribute 
to the de-legitimization of WTO juridical channels, the ineffectuality of multilateral negotiations, 
and a decline in members’ view of the WTO as respectable and sophisticated. To some extent, 
their predictions hold true. That said, this thesis suggests that in the Doha Round and in the arena 
of dispute settlement and trade remedies, China cannot be blamed for proactively undermining 
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force of the WTO system. In Doha, China behaved in a manner that should be expected of a 
large developing nation and a country that made significant concessions (or perceived itself to 
have made significant concessions) in its accession process. With regard to trade remedies cases 
and dispute settlement, China exhibited respect for the system and a desire to participate in the 
WTO’s best institution with sophistication. Though the aforementioned scholars are certainly 
“onto something,” so to speak, with regard to the degradation of evidentiary standards and the 
questionable uses and methods of NME AD methodologies, the problem lies not in the intra-
DSM behavior of China, but in the details and application of these rules themselves. WTO 
members create the NME rules with genuine intentions to make China’s WTO participation fair, 
safe, and functional. Still, the problem is not China cheating this system of rules and 
requirements, but that the rules no longer apply uniformly to the Chinese economic situation. 
China’s negative effect on the DSM exists because China’s participation, however benign or 
standard, illuminated the unpreparedness of the multilateral trading system to handle political-
economic diversity and political-economic ambiguity of membership. In one arena, that of 
currency manipulation, China exhibits proactive, deleterious behaviors that suggest a need for 
improvement within the WTO institutions and rules. The academic community’s attempt to 
address this shortcoming might lead to a future in which Bretton Woods institutions are 
synthesized and reformatted into a set of multipurpose organizations better equipped to target 
real-world economic problems and incentivize sovereign nations to mitigate these problems.  
As this thesis shows, China’s participation has strengthened certain institutions and 
norms in the WTO system. The Chinese narrative of arduously gained sophistication and 
institutional insight supports Keohane’s view that the ins-and-outs of the WTO system are in fact 
worth learning or at least necessary to learn to survive in the contemporary world. Further, 
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China’s compliance with WTO rulings supports the idea that, even if the DSM cannot handle 
political economy diversity its membership (including China) is working towards a point in 
which it can. Last, whether China is “converging” asymptotically towards capitalism or intent on 
“graduating” as a fully transparent and marketized country, the fact remains that China has lived 
up to many of its accession commitments, including tariff reduction and increased privatization. 
It shows that China understands that its “admittance to the club” is conditional and economically 
worthwhile. China’s non-capitalist and non-Western characteristics suggest that it would 
undermine a Westernized organization devoted to the “global capitalist system,” and thus its lack 
of an unequivocally deleterious effect the WTO seems surprising at first glance.290 But “China 
needs the WTO” in the long-term, so much so that that phrase was a pervasive Chinese saying in 
the accession lead-up.291 It is not that the WTO caused China to marketize, but rather, that China 
would have marketized anyway and the WTO is the natural place for a marketizing or 
marketized country to interact with the rest of the international community.  
This survey and new research can support international trade litigators as they prepare to 
revisit the controversial NME label at the WTO this December. As mentioned in the literature 
review, Urdinez and Masiero projected one quantitative effect of NME status on the dispute 
settlement system, namely that market economy status would lower “the number of anti-
dumping investigations against Chinese products.”292 However, the economics on the ground in 
China would not change as the result of this in-name switch to market economy. As this thesis 
suggests NME status is politically motivated and serves more so as a protectionist tool to keep 
certain Western industries afloat in the midst of increased importation of Chinese goods. It does 
show, though, that the steel industry still deserves the drastic and methodologically separate 
system that is the AD NME classification.  
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Some lawyers are, in the months leading up to this reassessment of NME status, stitching 
together arguments as to why China as a whole should retain NME classification. Though a point 
entirely political in nature, keeping the status quo would not undermine China’s respect for the 
WTO itself, as China has shown its commitment to the system despite the inability of the system 
to handle its political-economic idiosyncrasies. With or without NME status, the world’s second 
largest economy will continue to revere the WTO and contribute to it in an educated and 
sophisticated manner.293 Perhaps China’s participation in the WTO marks the beginning of an era 
in which those that join new international systems are motivated by what the international system 
can do, as it stands, to further the country’s interests rather than how the country can manipulate 
the international system for the advancement of said interests. 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sandra Kollen Ghizoni, “Establishment of the Bretton Woods System,” Federal Reserve 
History, November 22, 2013, accessed March 24, 2016, 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/28;	  Edward Mansfield, “Political 
Economy,” (lecture, PSCI 150: Intro to International Relations, the University of Pennsylvania, 
Fall 2012).	  2	  Devesh Kapur,  “Finance,” (lecture, PSCI 224: Political Economy of Development, the 
University of Pennsylvania, Fall 2015). 	  3	  Kapur, “Finance;” Ghizoni, “Establishment of the Bretton Woods System.” 	  4	  Devesh Kapur, “Finance;” Devesh Kapur,  “International Trade and Globalization,” (lecture, 
PSCI 224: Political Economy of Development, the University of Pennsylvania, Fall 2015).	  5	  Edward Mansfield, “Political Economy.” 	  
6 Eric Wyndham White, Olivier Long, and Arthur Dunkel. "The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT)." Die grossen zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsorganisationen, herausgegeben 
vom Schweizerischen Institut für Aussenwirtschafts-und Marktforschung an der Handels-
Hochschule St. Gallen, St. Gallen (1955). 
 http://global-economics.ca/GATT.UN.Encyclopedia.pdf	  	  7	  Edward Mansfield, “Political Economy.”	  8	  GATT 1947, The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, (Geneva: GATT, 1947), October 
30, 1947.  
9 WTO Secretariat, “Fiftieth Anniversary of the Multilateral Trading System,” World Trade 
Organization, 1998, accessed December 12, 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min96_e/chrono.htm; Monica Hsiao, “China and 
the GATT: Two Theories of Political Economy Explaining China’s Desire for Membership in 
Shapiro 78 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the GATT,” Pacific Basin Law Journal 12 no. 2 (1994), 
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/0k2882sf#page-3.  10	  “Members and Observers of the WTO,” World Trade Organization, updated November 30, 
2015, accessed December 12, 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/org6_map_e.htm.  11	  Claire Suddath, “U.S.-Cuba Relations,” Time Magazine, April 15, 2009, 
http://content.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1891359,00.html.	  	  12	  Jan Hoogmartens, EC Trade Law Following China’s Accession to the WTO, (Kluwer Law  
International, 2004).	  	  
13 Karl Kautsky, “Ultra-Imperialism,” Die Neite Zeit, September 11, 1914, 
http://www.platypus1917.org/wp-
content/uploads/readings/kautskykarl_ultraimperialism1914_NLR05804.pdf/.  
14 Kautsky, “Ultra-Imperialism.”   
15 Bert F. Hoselitz, “Socialism, Communism, and International Trade,” Journal of Political 
Economy, vol. 57, no. 3 (1949).	  	  16	  GATT 1947.	  17	  Wu Xiaohui, “No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal: Rethinking China’s Membership in the 
World Trade Organization.” Chinese Journal of International Law 10 (2011), 2. 	  18	  Hui Feng. The Politics of Chinese Accession to the World Trade Organization: The Dragon 
Goes Global (London: Routledge, 2012). 	  19	  Thomas Rumbaugh and Nicholas Blancher, “China: International Trade and WTO 
Accession.” Working Paper. International Monetary Fund, March 2004; Francisco Urdinez and 
Gilmar Masiero, “China and the WTO: Will the Market Economy Status Make Any Difference 
after 2016?” The Chinese Economy, 48 no. 2 (2015). 	  20	  Chad Bown and Meredith Crowley, “China’s Export Growth and the China Safeguard: Threats 
to the World Trading System?” Working Paper 5291. The World Bank (Development Research 
Group, Trade and Integration Team), May 2010.  	  
21 “Principles of the trading system,” WTO, last updated 2015, accessed October 30, 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact2_e.htm.  22	  Dr. Elena Pilipenko, “WTO in the Global Capitalist Economy System – Sight from Russia,” 
Journal of Contemporary Management, (2015), http://www.bapress.ca/jcm/jcm-article/1929-
0136-2015-02-85-08.pdf  
23 “Understanding the WTO: The Organization – Members and Observers,” World Trade 
Organization, updated November 30, 2015, accessed December 12, 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm.  
24 Keohane quoted in Urdinez and Masiero. “China and the WTO.”  
25 Bruce Wilson. “Compliance by WTO Members with Adverse WTO Dispute Settlement 
Rulings: The Record to Date.” Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 10 no. 2 (2007), 
http://jiel.oxfordjournals.org/content/10/2/397.abstract  
26 Julian Chaisse. “Deconstructing the WTO Conformity Obligation: A Theory of Compliance as 
a Process.” Fordham International Law Journal, vol. 38 no. 57 (2015), 
http://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/frdint38&div=5&g_sent=1&collection=jo
urnals.  27	  Chaisse. “Deconstructing the WTO Conformity Obligation.”	  
Shapiro 79 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 “Technical Information on Anti-Dumping,” WTO, last updated 2015, accessed October 30, 
2015, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/adp_e/adp_info_e.htm.  
29 “Technical Information on Anti-Dumping,” WTO.  30	  Wei Zhuang. “An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: 2001-2010.” The Law and Development Review, 4 no. 1 (2011).  31	  Tomer, Broude, Michael Moore, Chad P. Bown, and Petros C. Mavroidis. "US-Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam: A Stir-Fry of Seafood, Statistics, and 
Lacunae." World Trade Review 12, no. 2 (2013). 
32 Dukgeun Ahn and Jieun Lee. “Countervailing Duty Against China: Opening a Pandora’s Box 
in the WTO System?” (discussion paper, Research Seminar in International Economics, 
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI, April 26, 2011).  33	  “Anti-Dumping, Subsidies, Safeguards: Contingencies, Etc.” World Trade Organization, 
2016, accessed March 17, 2016, 
https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/agrm8_e.htm.	  	  	  
34 Urdinez and Masiero. “China and the WTO, 156.”  
35 Bruce Scott, “The Political Economy of Capitalism.” Working Paper 07-037. Harvard 
Business School, 2006. http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/07-037.pdf. 36	  Scott.” “The Political Economy of Capitalism.”	  37	  WTO litigator in discussion with the author, February 2016.	  38	  Scott.” “The Political Economy of Capitalism.”	  39	  Ibid. 	  
40 “Chapter 6: Economies in Transition,” (Lecture in Macroeconomics, Georgia State University, 
Atlanta, GA, http://www2.gsu.edu/~ecomaa/Lecture3.htm.  41	  “Chapter 6: Economies in Transition.”  GSU. 	  42	  Rumbaugh and Blancher, “China: International Trade and WTO Accession.”  43	  Vera Thorstensen, Daniel Ramos, Carolina Muller, and Fernanda Bertolaccini. “WTO – 
Market and Non-Market Economies: The Hybrid Case of China.” Latin American Journal of 
International Trade Law 1 (2013); World Trade Organization. The Analytical Index of the 
GATT: Article VI Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (Geneva: The World Trade 
Organization Secretariat, 1995). 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/gatt_ai_e/art6_e.pdf.  44	  WTO: Trade Remedies, ed. Rudiger Wolfrum, Peter- Tobias Stoll, and Michael Kobele. 
(Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL, 2008).  45	  World Trade Organization. The Analytical Index of the GATT.; WTO: Trade Remedies, ed. 
Rudiger Wolfrum, Peter- Tobias Stoll, and Michael Kobele. (Leiden, Netherlands: BRILL, 
2008).	  46	  WTO: Trade Remedies, ed. Wolfrum, Stoll, and Kobele. 	  47	  Thorstensen, Ramos, Muller, and Bertolaccini. “WTO – Market and Non-Market Economies.”	  
48 World Trade Organization. The Analytical Index of the GATT: Article VI Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties.  
49 WTO: Trade Remedies, ed. Wolfrum, Stoll, and Kobele.  
50Kommerskollegium National Board of Trade, “The EU Treatment of Non-Market Economy 
Countries in Antidumping Proceedings,” (Swedish Department of Commerce, 2005), 
http://www.kommers.se/upload/Analysarkiv/Arbetsomr%E5den/Antidumpning/Antidumpning%
Shapiro 80 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20-%20huvudsida/The_EU_Treatment_of_Non-
market_Economy_countries_in_antidumpingproceedings.pdf. 
51 Ahn and Lee. “Countervailing Duty Against China.”  
52 Kommerskollegium, “The EU Treatment of Non-Market Economy Countries in Antidumping 
Proceedings.” 
53 Ibid.   54	  Tariff Act of 1930, sub. IV (Countervailing and Antidumping Duties: Definitions and Special 
Rules), U.S. Code 19 § 4, https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/19/1677	  	  
55 Ma Ji.. “Challenge the Non-Market Economy Methodology Taken by EU and U.S. against 
China in WTO Anti-dumping Area.” (J.D. candidate research paper, Peking University Shenzhen 
Graduate School, 2012).  
56 Council regulation (EC) no. 1225/2009 of 30 November 2009 on protection against dumped 
imports from countries not members of the European Community (codified version), Official 
Journal of the European Union, L343/51, November 22, 2009, 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2010/april/tradoc_146035.pdf.	  	  57Ari Kokko, “EU and Vietnam: From a Parental to a Competitive Relationship?” Working 
Paper May 2010, (Stockholm and Copenhagen: Stockholm School of Economics and 
Copenhagen Business School, 2010), http://www.snee.org/filer/papers/612.pdf.	  
58 WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Notification of Laws and Regulations Under 
Article 18.5 of the Agreement: Argentina (Supplement), (Geneva: The World Trade 
Organization, 2006), G/ADP/N/1/ARG/1/Suppl.8, 
http://enforcement.trade.gov/trcs/downloads/documents/argentina/gadpn1arg1s8.pdf  59	  WTO Committee on Anti-Dumping Practices, Notification of Laws and Regulations Under 
Article 18.5 of the Agreement: Argentina (Supplement). 	  
60 Kommerskollegium, “The EU Treatment of Non-Market Economy Countries in Antidumping 
Proceedings.” 	  
61 Thorstensen, Ramos, Muller, and Bertolaccini. “WTO – Market and Non-Market Economies.”   62	  Tomer, Broude, Michael Moore, Chad P. Bown, and Petros C. Mavroidis. "US-Anti-Dumping 
Measures on Certain Shrimp from Viet Nam.”	  63	  Ibid.  	  64	  James Clifford Anderson, “WTO Appellate Body Upholds U.S. Safeguard Measures on 
Imported Tires from China: Legal Implications and Ramifications to Subsequent Trade Disputes 
and to Other Trade Industries” Global Business & Development Law Journal 1 no. 1 (2013); 
Steve Charnovitz and Bernard Hoekman, “US-Tyres: Upholding a WTO Accession Contract –
Imposing Pain for Little Gain,” World Trade Review 12 no. 2 (2013).  
65 “Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994 (Anti-Dumping Agreement),” The World Trade Organization, accessed December 2015, 
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/anti_dumping_02_e.htm  
66 Anti-Dumping Agreement, WTO.  
67 Anti-Dumping Agreement, WTO;	  The World Trade Organization, The Report of the Working 
Party on the Accession of China, 1 October 2001, WT/ACC/CHN/49.	  68	  World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, (1994), 
available at https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/24-scm.pdf	  	  69	  Piyush Chandra, WTO subsidy rules and tariff liberalization: evidence from accession of 
China. The Journal of International Trade & Economic Development, 23(8) (2014). 
Shapiro 81 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
70 Joost Paulewyn, “Treaty Interpretation or Activism? Comment on the AB Report on United 
States – ADs and CVDs on Certain Products from China” World Trade Review 12 no. 2 (2013).  71	  Paulewyn, “Treaty Interpretation or Activism?” 	  
72 Thomas Prusa and Edwin Vermulst, “United States – Definitive Anti-Dumping and 
Countervailing Duties on Certain Products from China: Passing the Buck on Pass Through,” 
World Trade Review 12 no. 2 (2013), http://econweb.rutgers.edu/prusa/cv/53%20-
%20US%20AD%20CVD%20China.pdf 
73The World Trade Organization, United States – Countervailing Duties Measures on Certain 
Products from China: Report of the Panel, 14 July 2014, WT/DS437/R, available at 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/437r_e.pdf.	  
74 John Jackson, “The Impact of China’s Accession on the WTO.” In China and the World 
Trading System, eds. Deborah Cass, Brett Williams, and George Barker, (Cambridge, UK: 
University of Cambridge Press, 2003), 24.   
75 Deborah Z Cass. “China and the ‘constitutionalization’ of international trade law.” In China 
and the World Trading System, eds. Deborah Cass, Brett Williams, and George Barker, 
(Cambridge, UK: University of Cambridge Press, 2003), 40-51.  76	  Cass. “China and the ‘constitutionalization’ of international trade law.”  
77 Chad Bown and Rachel McCullough. “U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict: Export 
Growth, Reciprocity, and the International Trading System.”  78	  Bown and McCullough. “U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict,” 2. 	  79	  Zhuang. “An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: 2001-2010.” 231. 	  80	  Xiaohui. “No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal.”   
81 Bown and McCullough. “U.S.-Japan and U.S.-China Trade Conflict.” 20-21; 33.  82	  Zhuang. “An Empirical Study of China's Participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement 
Mechanism: 2001-2010.” 242. 	  
83 Urdinez and Masiero. “China and the WTO: Will the Market Economy Status Make Any 
Difference after 2016?” The Chinese Economy, 48 no. 2 (2015).  
84 Ibid.  
85 Ibid.   86	  Laura Puccio, “Granting Market Economy Status to China: An Analysis of WTO Law and of 
Selected Members’ Policy,” European Parliamentary Research Service, November 2015, 
accessed December 11, 2015, 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2015/571325/EPRS_IDA(2015)571325_E
N.pdf	  
87 Ji.. “Challenge the Non-Market Economy Methodology Taken by EU and U.S. against China 
in WTO Anti-dumping Area.”  
88 Ibid.  
89 Ibid. 90	  Ibid.  
91 Ibid.  
92 Ibid.    93 Puccio, “Granting Market Economy Status to China.” 	  94	  Thorstensen, Ramos, Muller, and Bertolaccini. “WTO – Market and Non-Market Economies.”  
95 Ahn and Lee. “Countervailing Duty Against China.”   
Shapiro 82 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  96	  Mostafa Beshkar and Adam S Chilton. “Revisiting Procedure and Precedent in the WTO: An 
Analysis of US – Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures (China).” (presentation, WTO 
Case Law Conference, European University Institute, Fiesole, Italy, May 14-15, 2015).  97	  Beshkar and Chilton. “Revisiting Procedure and Precedent in the WTO.” 	  
98 Ibid., 25. 99	  Broude, Moore, Bown, and Mavroidis. "US-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam.”	  100	  World Trade Organization, “US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) (DS404),” WTO Dispute Settlement: 
One Page Case Summaries, 2011, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds404sum_e.pdf	  101	  The World Trade Organization, “US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) (DS404).”	  	  102	  Broude, Moore, Bown, and Mavroidis. "US-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam.”	  103	  Ibid. 	  104	  Ibid. 	  
105 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 1947/1994, Article VI: Antidumping 
Agreement. . (Geneva: GATT, 1947/1994).  106	  Broude, Moore, Bown, and Mavroidis. "US-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam.” 	  107	  Ibid. 	  108The World Trade Organization, “US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) (DS404).” 	  	  109	  Broude, Moore, Bown, and Mavroidis. "US-Anti-Dumping Measures on Certain Shrimp from 
Viet Nam.”	  110	  Ibid. 	  111	  Ibid. 	  112	  The World Trade Organization, “US – Shrimp (Viet Nam) (DS404).”  	  
113 Wu. “No Longer Outside, Not Yet Equal.”  
114 Ibid.  
115 Ibid.  
116 Ibid.  
117 Elizabeth Kreps and Anthony Clark Arend, “Why States Follow the Rules; Toward a 
Positional Theory of Adherence to International Legal Regimes,” Duke Journal of Comparative 
and International Law (2006), 383-386.	  	  
118 Pilipenko. “WTO in the Global Capitalist Economy System – Sight from Russia.”  
119 Scott Kennedy. “Contrasting History and a Common Future,” in Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, 
Christophe Bellmann and Shuaihua Cheng, eds., A Decade in the WTO: Implications for China 
and Global Trade Governance (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, December 2011).  
120 Kennedy. “Contrasting History and a Common Future.”  
121 Ibid.  
122 Ibid.  
123 “Disputes by County,” World Trade Organization, 2016, accessed March 11, 2016, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.html.	  	  124	  “Disputes by County,” World Trade Organization. 	  
Shapiro 83 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  125	  GATT 1994, WTO Agreement: Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY 
ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 4 (1999), 1867 U.N.T.S. 154, 33 
I.L.M. 1144 (1994); “Members and Observers,” The World Trade Organization.	  
126 Bown and Crowley. “China’s Export Growth and the China Safeguard,” 2.     
127 WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2007 (Geneva: World Trade Organization, 2007), 60; 
International trade consultant, in discussion with the author, November 2015. 128	  WTO Secretariat, World Trade Report 2007.  	  129	  Paul Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round,” in Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, Christophe 
Bellmann and Shuaihua Cheng, eds., A Decade in the WTO: Implications for China and Global 
Trade Governance (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development, 
December 2011).  
130 International trade lawyer with experience litigating at the WTO, in discussion with the 
author, November 2015.  
131 “Understanding the WTO: Basics, the Uruguay Round,” World Trade Organization, 2016, 
accessed March 11, 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact5_e.htm.	  	  
132 “Uruguay Round Agreement: TRIPS (Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights,” 
The World Trade Organization, 2016, accessed March 17, 2016, 
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_01_e.htm.  
133 Susanne K. Sell and Aseem Prakash. “Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest between Business 
and NGO Networks and Intellectual Property Rights,” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 48, 
(2004).  134	  Paper on the Trans-Pacific Partnership by Lauren Shapiro (thesis author) in April 2015.	  
135 World Trade Organization, Doha WTO Ministerial 2001: Ministerial Declaration, November 
2001, WT/MIN/DEC/1, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_e.pdf  
136 Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati (Columbia University), “Why the TPP is undermining the Doha 
Round,” East Asia Forum, 14 January 2013, accessed March 17, 2016, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/01/14/why-the-tpp-is-undermining-the-doha-round/.  137	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.	  138	  Ibid. 	  139	  Chin Leng Lim and Jiang Wu Wang, “China and the Doha Development Agenda Working 
Paper. World Trade Organization Forum, Geneva, September 2009. 	  
140 Andrew Stoler. “China’s Role in the World Trade Organization and the Doha Round of 
Multilateral Trade Negotiations,” (discussion paper, Second World Forum on China Studies, 
Institute for International Trade, Shanghai, China, 2006); Kennedy. “Contrasting History and a 
Common Future.”  141	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.; Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round.” 142	  Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round;” International trade lawyer with expertise in 
the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with the author, November 2015. 
143 “Doha: Some Technical Terms,” European Union, July 2008.  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2008/july/tradoc_139799.pdf  144	  “Doha: Some Technical Terms,” European Union. 	  145	  Ibid. 	  
Shapiro 84 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015; Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round.”	  147	  Gary Clayde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Woan Foong Wong. Figuring Out the Doha 
Round. (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2010).  	  148	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.	  149 Hufbauer, Schott, and Foong Wong. Figuring Out the Doha Round.  
150 Ka Zeng and Wei Liang. China and Global Trade Governance: China’s First Decade in the 
World Trade Organization. (Abington, UK: Routledge, 2013).	  	  151	  Email correspondence with international trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the 
Doha Round, 2016; International trade lawyer with expertise in Chinese trade policy, in 
discussion with the author, February 2016. 	  
152 Email correspondence with international trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the 
Doha Round, February 2016.  
153 Hufbauer, Schott, and Wong. Figuring Out the Doha Round.   154	  Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round;” International trade lawyer with expertise in 
the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with the author, November 2015.	  
155 Marc Bacchette and Bijit Bora. “Industrial Tariff Liberalization and the Doha Development 
Agenda,” (discussion paper, World Trade Organization, Development and Economic Research 
Division, Geneva, Switzerland, 2003).  
156 Email correspondence with international trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the 
Doha Round, February 2016.	  	  157	  WTO litigator in discussion with the author, February 2016. 	  158	  Ibid. 	  159	  Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round.”	  160	  Ibid. 	  161	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round in discussion with 
the author, November 2015. 	  161	  Bluestein. “China’s Impact on the Doha Round.” 	  162	  Ibid. 	  
163 United States General Accounting Office, Report to the Chairman, Committee Finance, U.S. 
Senate and to the Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means, House of Representatives: World 
Trade Organization, Cancun Ministerial Fails to Move Global Trade Negotiations Forward; 
Next Steps Uncertain, (Washington, DC: United States General Accounting Office, 2004), 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04250.pdf  
164 Stephen Woolcock, "The Singapore issues in Cancun: a failed negotiation ploy or a litmus 
test for global governance?" Intereconomics 38, no. 5 (2003): 249-255. 
165 Razeen Sally. “Chinese Trade Policy After (Almost) Ten Years in the WTO: A Post-Crisis 
Stocktake. Working Paper no. 2/2011, European Centre for International Political Economy 
(ECIPE) (2011), http://ecipe.org/app/uploads/2014/12/chinese-trade-policy-after-almost-ten-
years-in-the-wto-a-post-crisis-stocktake.pdf.  166	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round in discussion with 
the author, November 2015; L. Carsten Mahrenbach, The Trade Policy of Emerging Powers: 
Strategic Choices of Brazil and India, (New York City: Springer, 2013). 	  
Shapiro 85 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  167	  Surendra Bhandari, “Doha Round Negotiation: Problems, Potential Outcomes, and Possible 
Implications,” Trade Law and Development vol. 4 no. 2 (2012), 
http://www.tradelawdevelopment.com/index.php/tld/article/viewFile/4%282%29%20TL%26D%
20353%20%282012%29/140. 	  
168 Bhandari, “Doha Round Negotiation: Problems, Potential Outcomes, and Possible 
Implications;” Robert E. Baldwin, “resolving the Conflict Leading the Collapse of the Doha 
Round,” Vox Blog of the Center for Economic and Policy Research, 25 September 2008, 
http://www.voxeu.org/article/how-resolve-doha-stalemate-better-agricultural-safeguard-trigger  169	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.	  170	  Ibid. 	  171	  Ibid. 	  172	  “Agriculture, value added (% of GDP),” The World Bank,  
 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NV.AGR.TOTL.ZS?page=1. 	  173	  Agriculture, value added (% of GDP),” The World Bank.	  174	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.	  
175 The Oxford Handbook on the World Trade Organization, eds. Amrita Narlikar, Martin 
Daunton, Robert M. Stern, (Oxford, UK: OUP Oxford, 2012).  176	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.	  177	  Ibid. 	  
178 Kapur, “Finance;” Kapur,  “International Trade and Globalization;” International trade lawyer 
with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with the author, November 2015. 
179 Sungjoon Cho, “The Demise of Development in the Doha Round Negotiations,” Texas 
International Law Journal vol. 45, no. 3, 2010, 
http://www.tilj.org/content/journal/45/num3/Cho573.pdf  180	  International trade lawyer, in discussion with the author, February 2016. 	  181	  Ibid. 	  182	  Ibid. 	  183 International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015.	  	  184	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015; Carsten Mahrenbach, The Trade Policy of Emerging Powers: 
Strategic Choices of Brazil and India, (New York City: Springer, 2013). 	  185	  International trade lawyer with expertise in the history of the Doha Round, in discussion with 
the author, November 2015; “MOFCOM Spokesman Comments on the Conclusion of the 10th 
WTO Ministerial Conference,” Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China 
(MOFCOM), December 22, 2015.	  186	  Chad Bown and Meredith Crowley. "China's export growth and the China safeguard: threats 
to the world trading system?." Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique 
43, no. 4 (2010): 1353-1388.; WTO specialist, in discussion with the author, November 2015. 	  
187 Bown and Crowley. "China's export growth and the China safeguard: threats to the world 
trading system?” 
Shapiro 86 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  Ji, “Challenge the Non-Market Economy Methodology Taken by EU and U.S. against China 
in WTO Anti-dumping Area/” 	  
189 Bruce Blonigen, “Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Anti-Dumping Activity.” Working 
Paper 9625, National Bureau of Economic Research, April 2013, 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w9625.pdf.  
190 Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Final Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part: 
Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China [A-570-914],” 
Federal Register 73, no. 122 (June 24, 2008),   
 https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2008-06-24/pdf/E8-14252.pdf	  	  
191 United States Department of Commerce, Anti-Dumping Manual, “CHAPTER 10: NON-
MARKET ECONOMIES.”  192	  United States Department of Commerce, Anti-Dumping Manual, “CHAPTER 10: NON-
MARKET ECONOMIES.”	  193	  Ji.. “Challenge the Non-Market Economy Methodology Taken by EU and U.S. against China 
in WTO Anti-dumping Area;” Council of the European Union, “imposing a definitive anti-
dumping duty on imports of certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of 
China,” Official Journal of the European Union L29/1, EC no. 91/2009, January 31, 2009, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:029:0001:0035:EN:PDF 	  194	  United States Department of Commerce, Anti-Dumping Manual, “CHAPTER 10: NON-
MARKET ECONOMIES.”	  195	  Council of the European Union, “imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China.”	  
196 THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES: DEFINITIVE 
ANTI-DUMPING MEASURES ON CERTAIN IRON OR STEEL FASTENERS FROM CHINA: 
REPORT OF THE PANEL: ANNEX A: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES OF THE FIRST WRITTEN 
SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES, 3 DECEMBER 2010, WT/DS439/R.  
197 “International Trade Update: Non-Market Economy Companies Face Greater Hurdles to 
Attain Separate Rate Status in Antidumping Cases,” Sidley Austin LLP, May 7 2015, 
http://www.sidley.com/~/media/update-pdfs/2015/05/20150507-international-trade-update.pdf.  198	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Final Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances: Circular 
Welded Carbon Quality Steel Pipe from the People’s Republic of China,” Federal Register 73, 
no. 109 (June 5, 2008).  199	  “International Trade Update,” Sidley Austin LLP.   200	  Ibid.   201	  Email correspondence with expert in international political economy, March 2016.	  	  202	  Email correspondence with expert in international political economy, March 2016.	  	  203	  Blonigen, “Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Anti-Dumping Activity;” Tianshu Chu 
and Thomas Prusa, “The Reasons for and the Impact of Antidumping Protection: The Case of 
People’s Republic of China,” (discussion paper, the University of Washington, Seattle, WA, 
2003), https://faculty.washington.edu/karyiu/confer/beijing03/papers/chu.pdf  204	  Blonigen, “Evolving Discretionary Practices of U.S. Anti-Dumping Activity.” 	  205	  Chu and Prusa, “The Reasons for and the Impact of Antidumping Protection.”	  
Shapiro 87 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 The World Trade Organization, “US – Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties (China) 
(DS437),” WTO Dispute Settlement: One Page Case Summaries, 2011, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds379sum_e.pdf; The World 
Trade Organization, United States: Anti-Dumping Measures on Shrimp and Diamond Sawblades 
from China, WT/DS422/R, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds422_e.htm; 
The World Trade Organization, United States: Countervailing and Anti-Dumping Measures on 
Certain Products from China, WT/DS449/R, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds449_e.htm.  
207 Council of the European Union, “imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China;” author’s 
calculations.  
208 Ibid.  	  209	  The World Trade Organization, European Communities: Definitive Anti-Dumping Measures 
on Certain Iron or Steel Fasteners form China: Report of the Panel, 3 December 2010, 
WT/DS437/R.  210	  Council of the European Union, “imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain iron or steel fasteners originating in the People’s Republic of China.”	  211	  The World Trade Organization, United States: Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China: Report of the Panel, 22 October 2010, WT/DS439/R.	  212	  The World Trade Organization, United States: Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing 
Duties on Certain Products from China: Report of the Panel. 	  213	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Final Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part: 
Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China [A-570-914],” 
Federal Register 73, no. 122 (June 24, 2008).	  214	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Laminated Woven Sacks 
from the People’s Republic of China: Final Determination of Sales at Less Than Fair Value and 
Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances [A-570-916],” Federal Register 73, no. 122 
(June 24, 2008).	  215	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Certain Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Steel Line Pipe from the People’s Republic of China: Final Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances [A-570-
935],” Federal Register 73, no. 216 (November 6, 2008).	  216	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Certain Circular Welded 
Carbon Quality Steel Line Pipe from the People’s Republic of China.”	  
217 United States Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Fact Sheet: 
Commerce Initiates Antidumping Duty and Countervailing Duty Investigations of Imports of 
Certain New Pneumatic Off-The-Road Tires from China and India and a Countervailing Duty 
Investigation of Imports from Sri Lanka,” February 2016,   
 http://enforcement.trade.gov/download/factsheets/factsheet-multiple-new-pneumatic-off-the-
road-tires-ad-cvd-initiation-020416.pdf.	  	  218	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Final Determination of Sales 
at Less Than Fair Value and Affirmative Determination of Critical Circumstances, in Part: 
Light–Walled Rectangular Pipe and Tube from the People’s Republic of China.” 
Shapiro 88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 The World Trade Organization, United States: Anti-Dumping Measured on Shrimp and 
Diamond Sawblades from China; author’s calculations.	  	  220	  The World Trade Organization, United States: Anti-Dumping Measured on Shrimp and 
Diamond Sawblades from China.	  221	  Ibid.	  222	  Ibid. 	  223	  Ibid. 	  224 Ibid.  	  
225 The World Trade Organization, “US – Shrimp and Sawblades (China) (DS422),” WTO 
Dispute Settlement: One Page Case Summaries, 2012, 
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds422sum_e.pdf  226	  Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Preliminary Determination of 
Sales at Less Than Fair Value and Final Determination: Coated Free Sheet Paper from the 
People’s Republic of China,” Federal Register 72, no. 106 (June 4, 2007).  
227 Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Coated Free Sheet Paper from 
the People’s Republic of China;” author’s calculations.  
228 Department of Commerce International Trade Administration, “Coated Free Sheet Paper from 
the People’s Republic of China.”  
229 Ibid.   
230 Council of the European Union, “imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain footwear with uppers of leather originating in Vietnam and originating in the People's 
Republic of China, as extended to imports of certain footwear with uppers of leather consigned 
from the Macao SAR, whether declared as originating in the Macao SAR or not, following an 
expiry review pursuant to Article 11(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 384/96,” Official Journal 
of the European Union L352/1, EC no. 1294/2009, December 22, 2009.  
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/december/tradoc_145664.def.en.L352-2009.pdf	  	  231	  Council of the European Union, “imposing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of 
certain footwear with uppers of leather.” 	  
232 National Bureau of Statistics of China, China Statistical Yearbook 2014, (Beijing: China 
Statistics Press, 2014) http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2014/indexeh.htm.  
233 Indian Government Department of Public Enterprises, “Chapter 1: Performance Overview 
2012-2013,” in Public Enterprises Survey 2012-2013: vol-1.  
http://dpe.nic.in/sites/upload_files/dpe/files/survey1213/survey01/Overview.pdf  
234 Indian Government Department of Public Enterprises, “List of CPSEs for the Year 2012-
2013,” http://dpemou.nic.in/moufiles/cpse_list_2012-13.pdf  
235 Tyre Corporation of India Ltd., Annual Report 2010-2011 and notes, (Kolkata, India: Tyre 
Corporation of India Secretary, 2011), http://tcilcorp.gov.in/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Click-
Here-to-View-Annual-Report-2010-2011.pdf	  	  	  	  
236 Mishra Dhatu Migam (MADHANI), Annual Directors’ Report 2011-2012 Appendix II, 2011, 
http://www.midhani.gov.in/doc/annualreport/AR-EN-2011-12.pdf  
237 Steel Authority of India, Annual Report 2011-2012, accessed March 11, 2016, 
http://www.sail.co.in/sites/default/files/areport-2011-12.pdf  
238 Rashyita Ispat Nigam Limited (Vizag Steel), Annual Report 2011-2012, 
https://www.vizagsteel.com/images/Annual%20Report%202011-12%20(English).pdf	  	  
Shapiro 89 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
239 Hindustan Paper Corporation Limited, Annual Report 2011-2012, 
http://dhi.nic.in/writereaddata/UploadFile/Annual%20Report%20(2011-2012)%20-
%20Hindustan%20Paper%20Corporation%20Ltd.%20(HPC).pdf  
240 Ministry of Textiles, Annual Report 2011-2012 (Government of India, 2012), 
http://texmin.nic.in/sites/default/files/ar_11_12_english.pdf.	  	  
241 Instituto Brasiliero de Geografia e Estatistica, Tabela 1 - Produção e vendas dos produtos 
e/ou serviços industriais, segundo as classes de atividades e a descrição dos produtos - Brasil – 
2011: Fabricação de calçados de couro, in Prequista Industrial, 2011, vol 30, no 2 (2011), 
http://biblioteca.ibge.gov.br/visualizacao/periodicos/1719/pia_2011_v30_n2_produto.pdf.  
242 “Output Value of IBS According to ISIC 2 Digit, 2008-2013 (Billion USD),” Badan Pusat 
Statistik (Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics), accessed March 17, 2016, 
http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1068.  243	  Trade consultant in discussion with the author, February 2016.	  244	  International trade lawyer, in discussion with the author, February 2016.	  245	  Ji, “Challenge the Non-Market Economy Methodology Taken by EU and U.S. against China 
in WTO Anti-dumping Area.”  246	  Author’s calculations using average constructed exchange rate of 7.22 rupees to the yuan 
(renminbi) (from weekly rates) in 2011. Exchange rates compiled from 
http://www.xe.com/currencyconverter/. 	  
247 World Steel Association, World Steel in Figures 2012, (Brussels: World Steel Association, 
2012), 
https://www.worldsteel.org/dms/internetDocumentList/bookshop/WSIF_2012/document/World
%20Steel%20in%20Figures%202012.pdf  248	  International trade lawyer and WTO expert in discussion with the author, November 2015.	  249	  Ibid. 	  250	  The World Trade Organization, United States: Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China: Report of the Panel: Addendum.  
251 Ibid.   
252 Ibid. 	  	  253	  International trade lawyer and dispute settlement expert in discussion with the author, 
February 2015.	  254	  Stoler. “China’s Role in the World Trade Organization and the Doha Round of Multilateral 
Trade Negotiations.”	  
255 United Nations, World Economic Situation and Prospects 2012: Statistical Annex, (New York 
City, United Nations, 2012), 
http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2012country_class.pdf; 
“Saudi Arabia,” Observatory of Economic Complexity (OEC), accessed March 17, 2016, 
http://atlas.media.mit.edu/en/profile/country/sau/.	  	  
256 Summer Said, “Potential Saudi Aramco IPO Wouldn’t Include Oil Reserves,” Wall Street 
Journal, January 24, 2016, http://www.wsj.com/articles/potential-saudi-aramco-ipo-wont-
include-reserves-1453627558.  257	  The World Trade Organization, United States: Countervailing Duty Measures on Certain 
Products from China: Report of the Panel: Addendum. 	  258	  International trade lawyer and dispute settlement expert in discussion with the author, 
February 2015.	  
Shapiro 90 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  259	  Ibid. 	  260	  Ibid. 	  261 Feng. The Politics of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization. 	  
262 Ibid.   263	  International trade lawyer and dispute settlement expert, in discussion with the author, 
February 2015.	  
264 Pasha L. Hsieh, “China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal 
Capacity Building,” Journal of International Economic Law, vol. 13 no. 4 (2010), note 46, 
http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:3380/content/13/4/997.full.pdf+html.  265	  Feng. The Politics of China’s Accession to the World Trade Organization. 	  266	  International trade lawyer and dispute settlement expert, in discussion with the author, 
February 2015. 
267 “The WTO Accessions Internship Programme,” The World Trade Organization, 2016, 
accessed March 17, 2016, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/acc_internship_e.htm.	  	  
268Joseph E. Gagnon, “Combating Widespread Currency Manipulation,” Peterson Institute for 
International Economics, July 2012, p. 1-3, http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb12-19.pdf.  
269 Robert Scott, “Currency Manipulation and the 896,000 U.S. Jobs Lost Due To The U.S.-
Japan Trade Deficit,” Economic Policy Institute, February, 2015, p. 3, 
http://s4.epi.org/files/2014/JapanCurrencyManipulation.pdf.  
270 Gagnon, “Combating Widespread Currency Manipulation,” PIIE.  
271 C. Fred Bergsten and Joseph E Gagnon, “Currency Manipulation, the US Economy, and the 
Global Economic Order,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, December 2012, 
http://www.iie.com/publications/pb/pb12-25.pdf  
272 C. Fred Bergsten, “Addressing Currency Manipulation Through Trade Agreements,” 
Peterson Institute for International Economics, January 2014, 
http://www.piie.com/publications/pb/pb14-2.pdf  
273 Trade consultant and legal counselor in discussion with the author, March 2015.  
274 Bergsten, “Addressing Currency Manipulation Through Trade Agreements,” PIIE.   
275 William Krist, “Negotiations for a Trans-Pacific Partnership,” Woodrow Wilson Center for 
International Scholars, 2012, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Krist_Draft_Discussion_Paper_%2071812.pdf; 
Notes and Supplementary Provisions to Article VI (Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Duties) 
(January 1948), General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Ad Article VI:2 (Paragraphs 2 and 3), 
p. 64, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf; Jonathan Sanford, “Currency 
Manipulation: The IMF and WTO,” Congressional Research Service, January 28, 2011, 
accessed April 20, 2015, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RS22658_20110128.pdf  
276 Yin-Wong Cheung, “Exchange Rate Misalignment: The Case of the Chinese Renminbi,” 
Working Paper no. 3797 (CESifo, 2012).  
277 Cheung “Exchange Rate Misalignment: The Case of the Chinese Renminbi.”  
278 International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund 
(2011 Edition) (Washington, D.C.: International Monetary Fund Publications, 2011), 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/aa/pdf/aa.pdf  279	  International Monetary Fund, Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund; 
Sanford, “Currency Manipulation: the IMF and the WTO.”	  	  
Shapiro 91 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
280 Nitsan Chorev and Sarah Babb, “The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international 
institutions: A comparison of the IMF and the WTO,” Theory and Society, vo. 38 no. 5 (2009).  281	  Chorev and Babb, “The crisis of neoliberalism and the future of international institutions.” 	  
282 Ellen Kennedy,  “David Ricardo,” (lecture, PSCI 186: Money and Markets, the University of 
Pennsylvania, November 4, 2014).  283	  International trade lawyer with expertise in Chinese trade policy and dispute settlement, in 
discussion with the author, November 2015.	  
284 Luciana Maria de Oliveira, “Improving the Effectiveness of the DSB of the WTO and the 
Accession Process for the New Members: The Case of China,” Settlements of Trade Disputes 
between China and Latin American Countries vol. 1, Laws in Emerging Economies Series 
(2015), 97-130.  285	  Hsieh, “China’s Development of International Economic Law and WTO Legal Capacity 
Building.” 	  286	  International trade lawyer, in discussion with the author, February 2016.	  287	  Ibid. 	  288	  Ibid. 	  
289 International trade lawyer, in discussion with the author, February 2016; “Principles of the 
trading system” World Trade Organization. 
290 Pilipenko, “WTO in the Global Capitalist Economy System – Sight from Russia;”; Stoler. 
“China’s Role in the World Trade Organization and the Doha Round of Multilateral Trade 
Negotiations.”  	  291	  Zhenyu Sun, “China’s Experience of 10 Years in the WTO,” in Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, 
Christophe Bellmann and Shuaihua Cheng, eds, A Decade in the WTO: Implications for China 
and Global Trade Governance (Geneva: International Centre for Trade and Sustainable 
Development, December 2011).	  292	  Urdinez and Masiero, “China and the WTO.”  293	  Sun, “China’s Experience of 10 Years in the WTO.”  	  
